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Introduction
The debate between conservation, or the responsible use of nature, and preservation, or
the protection of nature due to its inherent worth, gripped much of environmentalism’s history in
the United States. 1 Exceptions did exist, such as Ellen Swallow Richards’s work on water and
air that led to the creation of fields such as ecology and home economics, Alice Hamilton’s
achievements in improving conditions for workers by pioneering the field of industrial
toxicology, and the work of progressives to solve social inequalities and improve the
environmental conditions within cities, but they more so existed concurrently with the
developing environmental movement rather than as proponents who characterized the
widespread environmentalist body of thought. 2 While the traditional environmental movement
did make major gains in terms of either the responsible use or protection of natural resources,
many early environmentalists did not focus on areas where people lived or the environmental
conditions that impacted human health.
This framework began to change after World War II. United States citizens, desiring a
more comfortable standard of living after years of war and economic depression and believing
that technological and scientific advancements would fix environmental problems, prioritized
consumerism over protecting the environment. 3 Both conservationists and preservationists

1

For a more in-depth discussion on the contrasts between conservation and preservation, see Benjamin Kline, First
Along the River: A Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement (New York: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2011), 60-68.
2
For a more in-depth discussion on the work of Ellen Swallow Richards, see Pamela Swallow, The Remarkable Life
and Career of Ellen Swallow Richards: Pioneer in Science and Technology (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 2014); for a more in-depth discussion of Alice Hamilton, see Barbara Sicherman, Alice Hamilton: A Life
in Letters (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003); for a more in-depth discussion on the work of progressives,
and of women progressives and settlement houses in particular, see Maureen Flanagan, America Reformed:
Progressives and Progressivisms 1890s-1920s (New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007).
3
Benjamin Kline, First Along the River, 79-80.
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suffered from a lack of support and compensated by attempting to connect their goals with
human needs and survival. 4 This provided a favorable background to the development of the
modern-day environmental movement, starting with the publication of Silent Spring in 1962.
With Silent Spring, Rachel Carson drew attention to the dangers that indiscriminate uses of
synthetic chemicals and pesticides, especially DDT, had not only for the environment but also
for human health. 5
Soon, environmentalism in the United States focused more and more on issues and crises
related to the areas in which people lived and to the aspects that impacted public health rather
than in a distant land of relatively untouched nature. In particular, the crisis at Love Canal in
Niagara Falls, New York during the late 1970s and early 1980s provided the starting point to the
awareness and activism of modern environmental history as well as early successes such as the
development of Superfund. Recently, an environmental crisis related to drinking water occurred
in Flint, Michigan in the mid-2010s that showcases how various aspects of the modern day
environmental movement have developed over time since the Love Canal crisis. A comparison
between the two events yields insights into the reactions that governmental figures, the medical
and scientific community, and the public have in regards to environmental crises.
While these events show a consistency in how government officials and the public react
to environmental crises impacting public health, the medical and scientific communities show a
change in its actions in regards to these crises. Government officials tend to react to
environmental crises impacting public health with apathy and denial until substantial citizen
action prompts them to acknowledge and attempt to solve the problem. The way the public

4

Ibid, 81-82.
The use of metaphor to compare the widespread use of synthetic chemicals and nuclear fallout also resounded in
the United States public given the context of the Cold War. Ibid, 83.
5
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initially reacts to environmental crises causing public health issues has changed, with the public
now generally trusting and supporting those impacted by the crises versus initially distrusting
their claims, but the relationship between government action and citizen action has remained
stable. In contrast, the orientation of the scientific and medical community towards activists in
health-based environmental crises has remarkably changed; a comparison between the actions of
scientific and medical experts in the Love Canal crisis and the Flint water crisis shows a
historical shift where these experts now respond favorably to the activists’ request for help, as
opposed to staying uninvolved and to not having an ethical obligation to help residents fight
against environmental injustice.
Background of the Love Canal crisis
History of the Niagara River as a Precursor to Love Canal
The foundation for a crisis such as Love Canal found its roots in colonial times from the
17th century. Early explorers recognized the river’s potential for commercial prospects. 6 As the
Niagara Falls became established in the conscience of the North American sublime, private
businessmen and countries took advantage of the waterway’s business and military possibilities
via developing transportation infrastructure. In the 1720s, the French built Fort Niagara, which
became a symbol of overcoming the environment by the mid-1700s. 7
As interest in developing the Niagara River increased throughout the 1800s, the belief
that technology overpowered nature grew with it. 8 Plans to build a Niagara Ship Canal began to
develop in the 1830s, starting with William Williams, a renowned surveyor and famous engineer.
Williams submitted a report to Congress in 1836 that detailed canal routes and engineering

6

Richard Newman, Love Canal: A Toxic History from Colonial Times to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 18-21.
7
Ibid, 22-24.
8
Ibid, 30, 31.
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proposals for the canal. 9 While never realized due to finances, this project embodied the
growing trend of using the Niagara Falls to test the idea that people could redesign nature for
their own purposes. 10
This project also inspired William Love to seek a new canal project starting in the
1890s. 11 The trends in technological development turned to hydroelectric power, which
intensified interest and development in the Niagara River. 12 Love planned to create a
progressive, environmentally-conscious city close to the falls, where a canal deriving from it
would provide hydroelectric power to a manufacturing hub. 13 However, Love, too, would fail in
his canal aspirations due to finances, but not before he had a canal already partially dug. Others
who attempted to continue the canal project did not see it to completion, and they would forsake
their projects without filling in the canal. 14
Repurposing the Abandoned Canal
At first, the abandoned canal saw innocent uses, such as a child’s swimming pool, but
growth in the chemistry industry in the early 1900s would change that. Elon Huntington Hooker,
the founder of Hooker Electrochemical, spearheaded the development of the chemistry industry
in the Niagara River region, motivated by a vision of both “chemical superiority” and
environmentally-conscious engineering inspired by Teddy Roosevelt-style conservatism. 15 Due
to the World Wars, the Cold War, and the growing consumer culture, Hooker’s production
exponentially increased, creating urgent disposal space problems. Hooker began to bury its

9

Ibid, 31-32; William Williams, Report of a survey around the Falls of Niagara, with a view to the construction of a
ship canal, presented in the United States’ 24th Congress, 1st Session, Document 214, April 14th, 1836.
10
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 34.
11
Ibid, 34, 36.
12
Ibid, 36.
13
Ibid, 36-37.
14
Ibid, 36-52.
15
Ibid, 51, 53-73.
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chemical waste in the canal in 1942, legal at the time, and would eventually bury approximately
22,000 tons of waste in the canal, thinking that the clay foundation would contain the waste. 16
The company did not worry about liabilities from the toxic dump. In fact, when Hooker
sealed Love Canal in 1953, company officials did not follow through with plans to completely
cover the top of the dump with a clay cap and did not fence the area off. Despite clear signs of
future problems, such as signs of settling and leakage in the topsoil and reports of underground
springs pressuring the dump, Hooker did not take any special records or concern. The lack of
follow-through with safe disposal techniques and records corresponded to the status-quo of the
industry at this time due to the lack of universal laws regarding toxic disposal and the common
lack of concern from both companies and the government regarding future environmental
hazards. 17
The Baby Boom brought a rapidly increasing population to Niagara Falls’ city, which had
long since annexed Lasalle, the site of Love Canal. Soon, the area became sought after for
development, and the Niagara Schools Board purchased Love Canal from Hooker in 1953 for a
dollar. Despite repeated warnings of the toxins underground and a clause in the property deed
that absolved Hooker of all liabilities related to the property, the board bought the property and
immediately began building a school and neighborhood on it. 18 In the face of problems such as
the original foundation of the school sinking into “a pit of chemicals,” construction carried on. 19
When constructing the school, the contractor discovered the toxic dump while attempting
to dig a foundation. The school board simply instructed the contractor to locate the school a few

16

Ibid, 74-82.
Ibid, 83-87.
18
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Waste – Love Canal, Niagara Falls, New York, by
Lawrence Moriarty, October 18, 1977; Richard Newman, Love Canal, 87-89.
19
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 87-89.
17
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yards away from the canal on a slab. Additionally, the school board ordered a drain that would
collect leachate around the school and transport it to the sewers that led to the Niagara River. 20
This clearly evidenced a disregard for the environment and for public health in light of
development and expansion, especially in the context of the demands that the increasing
population and the post-war consumerism brought to Niagara Falls.
From the 1930s to the 1950s, environmentalism still focused on conservationist ideals
and on saving the “wilderness” from adverse human activities and pollution. Environmentalists
gained interest in the Niagara River region due to the rising water pollution and perceived
industrial infringements upon its nature. As environmentalists attacked the idea that people
could improve nature through technology and development, they defined nature as the area that
people had not yet changed. Therefore, areas such as Love Canal did not come under scrutiny.
Under a combination of environmentalist apathy and lack of concern by the City of Niagara
Falls, the people forgot about the toxic dump under Love Canal. 21 School would begin in 1955
without protests nor concerns. 22
However, the signs of the dump did not disappear as the public memory of the dump did.
Love Canal continued to expand and become one of the most sought after subdivision to live in,
but residents complained about “odd odors and various health concerns.” 23 These consistent
reports led officials at all levels of government to investigate the canal by the mid-1970s.
Rediscovering the dump, officials examined it between 1976 and 1978, finding that the
chemicals leaked from the dump and contaminated the homes and the surrounding environment.

20

Lois Gibbs, Love Canal, 91.
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 90-95.
22
Ibid, 89.
23
Ibid, 101-103; United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Waste – Love Canal, Niagara Falls,
New York, by Lawrence Moriarty, October 18, 1977.
21

Hughey 8
Various reports throughout 1977 and 1978 confirmed the problem, promoted containment of the
chemicals, and even suggested moving the residents, yet the residents remained unaware of the
toxins.24
Lawrence Moriarty, an EPA officer, desired a solution other than containment. Seeing
the dump as a public health hazard, he believed that officials should consider purchasing the
homes around the canal, demolish them, and remediate the area. 25 However, fearing damage to
Niagara Falls’ reputation, local authorities refused to take drastic action and instead implemented
“minimal containment measures” for the “relatively minor Love Canal problem.” 26 Given the
lack of public awareness about the problem, these officials did not face pressure to implement
other measures.
In time, private citizens began to take more notice of the effects of the canal. The harsh
freeze and thaw cycle in 1977 in Niagara Falls led to increased chemical leaks, and as residents
watched health officials study their homes and neighborhood for toxin containment, concerns
grew. This led Michael Brown of the Niagara Gazette to report a human-interest story on Love
Canal in 1978 about families who reported environmental and health problems related to the
chemicals. 27 His coverage would grab the attention of future Love Canal activists and would
begin the grassroots movement of Love Canal.

24

Richard Newman, Love Canal, 103-105; United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Waste – Love
Canal, Niagara Falls, New York, by Lawrence Moriarty, October 18, 1977; United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Draft Report: Analysis of a Ground Water Contamination Incident in Niagara Falls, New York, by Fred C.
Hart Associates, Inc., July 28, 1978; United States Environmental Protection Agency, Final Report: Quantification
of Toxic Materials in Ambient Air at “Old Love” Canal, Niagara Falls, NY, by Edo Pellizzari and William Librizzi,
circa 1978.
25
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 105-107; United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Waste – Love
Canal, Niagara Falls, New York, by Lawrence Moriarty, October 18, 1977.
26
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 106; United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Waste – Love
Canal, Niagara Falls, New York, by Lawrence Moriarty, October 18, 1977.
27
Richard Newman, Love Canal, 107-109.
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Story of Love Canal
In 1978, after reading Brown’s articles, Lois Gibbs, a housewife living in the Love Canal
neighborhood, became alarmed at the prospect that her son’s severe illnesses may come from the
chemicals buried underneath the school he attended. 28 When the school’s superintendent refused
to transfer her son to another school, Gibbs began informing her neighborhood about the toxic
dump and organizing a petition to close the school. 29 As she gathered signatures, her neighbors
talked to her about their illnesses and the environmental problems with their homes, and Gibbs
realized that the chemical hazards “involved much more than the 99th Street School.” 30 Soon
afterwards, Gibbs concluded that environmental hazard created such a large and unavoidable
public health risk that only relocation could keep the residents safe.
The local and state government officials did not initially agree to conduct a complete and
permanent relocation, and over the next two years, Gibbs and other residents organized into the
Love Canal Homeowners Association and into other organizations in order to protest what they
perceived as governmental inaction in face of an urgent and hazardous environmental crisis. The
interactions between residents and officials often did not result in productive discussion or
action. Instead, a lack of transparency and an effort to undermine the residents’ concerns and
credibility tended to define the governmental response in these interactions.
Lack of Transparency and Undermining Resident Concerns
In accounts of meetings between residents and governmental officials, Gibbs often
reported that officials answered resident questions and concerns with secrecy, a lack of
transparency, and often an outright refusal to respond at all. This began at the start of the crisis

28

Lois Gibbs, Love Canal: And the Birth of the Environmental Health Movement (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
2011), 26-27.
29
Ibid, 30-32.
30
Ibid, 34.
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in June 1978, when the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) held a public meeting
in the neighborhood to explain that officials would take blood and environmental samples from
the first ring houses to determine if the canal posed a health concern and to discuss the
construction plan they developed in order manage the “overflow” of chemicals from the canal.
Throughout the meeting, the citizens became increasingly frustrated at the lack of substantial
answers or outright avoidance the staff provided in response to their concerns, questions, and
criticisms that pointed out problems with the construction plan. 31 At a follow-up reading where
residents received air sample results from their homes, the officials’ inability or unwillingness to
answer questions and describe the meanings behind the readings caused panic, confusion, and an
increased tenor behind the resident complaints, especially when Gibbs’s professional contacts
confirmed the severity of the readings. Frustrated, the residents’ support of Gibbs petition
strengthened, and others, including residents such as Debbie Cerillo and outside experts, started
to join her in actively protesting the government’s response to the crisis. 32
This initial increase in the tenor behind the residents’ complaints and the growing validity
that experts gave to it seemed to encourage the government officials to discourage resident
activism rather than act on their concerns. When announcing the emergency order regarding
Love Canal that closed 99th Street School during construction, told residents to not eat from their
gardens, and recommended that pregnant women and children under two should move, the
NYSDOH scheduled the meeting in Albany instead of in the neighborhood. 33 The new location
meant that fewer residents could attend, and despite calling the senator, the congressman, and the

31

Ibid, 35-38.
Ibid, 34, 39, 42-45.
33
Gibbs, Love Canal, 45-49; Ecumenical Task Force of the Niagara Frontier, Inc., “History of Disaster at Love
Canal: Chronology of Events” in Progress Report of the Ecumenical Task Force of the Niagara Frontier, Inc. (July
1980), 27-43; Robert Whalen, Order: State of New York: Department of Health in the Matter of Love Canal
Chemical Waste Landfill Sites Located in the City of Niagara Falls, Albany, NY, August 2, 1978.
32
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governor about this problem, Gibbs could not secure the relocation of the meeting to the
neighborhood. In comparison, Hooker Corporation flew in a neighborhood representative who
believed the construction would work and who did not want the other neighbors to get involved
in the situation. 34 Given the publicity of this order, the government wanted the reporters to avoid
noticing the vocal and upset residents.
When the attempt to avoid having vocal residents attend the emergency order failed, the
officials acted to minimize the concerns the residents had. Residents worried that the chemicals
in the canal harmed people who did not the order’s parameters and wondered why the state did
not offer any assistance in light of the emergency order. 35 Eventually, the health commissioner
chose to leave rather than answer questions. In his absence, officials tried to reassure Gibbs and
Cerillo that health surveys did not reveal a problem at health canal, but in reality, this health
emergency declaration came from a state survey that interviewed 200 families residing close to
the canal in depth and showed alarming and rising health impacts from the canal. Additionally,
the engineer for the remedial construction plan avoided directly answering Gibbs’s concerns
about the impacts of underground streams on the project with answers deliberately crafted to be
incomprehensible to a non-engineer. 36
The residents did not take kindly to an emergency order from officials who first created a
road block to their participation in it and then refused to respond to their concerns and questions.
The evening of the order, about 400 neighbors formed a mob on 99th Street, where they screamed
and burned their mortgages and tax bills to protest the responses to their concerns and to demand

34

Gibbs, Love Canal, 45-49.
Thomas Fletcher, “Neighborhood change at Love Canal: contamination, evacuation, and resettlement,” Land Use
Policy 19 (2002), 314.
36
Gibbs, Love Canal, 49-52; Newman, Love Canal, 114; for more information on the 1978 state data on known
Love Canal pollution and health risks that also played a role in this health declaration, see State of New York
Department of Health, Love Canal – Public Health Time Bomb: A Special Report to the Governor and Legislature,
September 1978.
35
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relocation. 37 In the local follow-up meeting the next day, the angered residents packed the
auditorium interrupted the commissioner’s reading of the order, demanding answers and
shouting about the health impacts the canal had on them. Gibbs described the scene,
“Lois Heisner was crying. ‘My daughter already has birth defects. She already has
horrible illnesses. She is already sick. What are you going to do for her? She’s already
over three. Does that mean she has to stay and die? We have chemicals in our basement.
You took an air reading. I’ve got this air reading and I don’t even know what it means.
Does it mean our lives are in jeopardy?’ She just cried and cried.
She looked so distraught, so helpless, pleading for help, and Tom Frey [the meeting’s
conductor] said, ‘Let’s call this thing to order. One person at a time. We can’t have
everybody screaming and hollering.’ The more he said that, the angrier the crowd got.
Everyone started screaming…” 38
As the crowd became more and more hysterical, the officials failed to provide answers or
solutions to the residents. For example, when asked to interpret the air readings distributed
previously, the officials refused to make them clear because the OSHA standards did not apply to
residential areas and populations, stating that, “We don’t have anything for a residential area.” 39
In the midst of this, Gibbs demanded to know why Governor Carey did not attend the meeting,
given the emergency situation. When Frey answered that the governor would not come due to
campaigning, the residents became belligerent, leading Frey to promise to ask the governor to
come to Love Canal. As the meeting progressed, Gibbs described Whalen as staying silent and
glaring at her. 40
Despite the fact that the government had known about the contamination from the dump
since 1976 and had the health data to initiate an emergency order, officials acted to hide the
problem from the residents and attempt to dissuade residential participation in solving the
problem. They did not provide support for those wanting to follow the evacuation

37

Gibbs, Love Canal, 52-55.
Ibid, 56.
39
Ibid, 57.
40
Ibid, 56-58.
38

Hughey 13
recommendation nor would they provide information or practical help for the residents. The
residents would have to focus on increasing their protest efforts and public visibility in order to
see further government action.
Residents Organize to Combat Governmental Inaction
Infuriated at the officials’ behavior, Gibbs and the residents formed the Love Canal
Homeowners Association on August 4th, 1978. They set four goals: evacuate residents who
wanted to leave, especially when construction took place, find solutions to the sinking property
values, fix the canal “properly”, and have air, soil, and water testing done in the entire
neighborhood in order to pinpoint the spread of the toxins. 41 This association would develop a
strong common front whose work in persuading the public that the entire neighborhood needed
to evacuate at government expense and that Love Canal created a public health crisis led to
eventual governmental action. 42
Formally organizing the residents and working towards increasing their political pressure
via public awareness and media coverage of their protests seemed to prompt increased
governmental action. Immediately after the formation of the association, governmental officials
began to arrive at the neighborhood and ask Gibbs and Cerillo to give them a tour and show them
the environmental concerns. In August, Governor Carey followed through with Gibbs’s request
to meet with the Love Canal residents, and when the residents’ “screaming and shouting” during
a televised meeting threatened to hinder his re-election campaign, Governor Carey suddenly
agreed to buy the first and second ring homes and to pay for the relocation and damaged
belongings of the residents. In response to other residents who wanted to move but lived further
out, the governor promised to relocate residents “if contamination and health problems were

41
42

Ibid, 58-60.
Newman, Love Canal, 118-119.
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proven in areas away from the canal.” 43 Additionally, President Carter declared a federal state of
emergency in rings one and two, the first time a president did that for a man-made environmental
crisis. 44 Apparently, the increased political pressure from the residents’ activism seemed to
prompt further governmental action.
However, he “had promised more than he had federal money to pay for,” beginning a
battle between state and federal agencies about where these funds would come from. 45 The
economic recession in 1974-5 that New York had not yet completely recovered from exacerbated
this issue, as the tight state budget did not seem to have the ability to accommodate a large
purchase of homes and relocations. 46 While the activism and protests at that time prompted an
official to verbally acquiesce to some of their demands, it did not guarantee which governmental
agency would take responsibility for the demands nor did it guarantee a timely follow-through on
the demands. Soon, residents would realize that they still needed to rely on activism in order to
see a promise turn into governmental action.
Broken Promises
The next day, state officials denied these promises, refusing to relocate anyone who lived
past the ring one houses. However, in the evening, Gibbs received a call from Bill Wilcox from
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, who had earlier taken a tour of the Love Canal
neighborhood. He asked her to attend a meeting at the White House the next day, where officials
discussed Love Canal evacuations. Near the end, Frey asked Gibbs to join press conferences that
released the news about the purchase of the ring two homes, and Gibbs realized that they wanted

43

Gibbs, Love Canal, 61-71.
Thomas Fletcher, “Neighborhood change at Love Canal,” 315.
45
Gibbs, Ibid, 65-66.
46
Amy Hay, “Recipe for Disaster: Motherhood and Citizenship at Love Canal,” Journal of Women’s History 21, no.
1 (2009), 113.
44
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her there to show community involvement in the decision. After the press conferences, officials
asked Gibbs to go to the school and stop a rally, which she refused. 47
As for Governor Carey’s promise to consider relocations outside of the first two rings,
the local and state officials showed signs of not relocating anyone else outside of ring one and
ring two. The mayor, angered at the residents’ persistence and worried a potential decline in
tourism due to rising publicity on the Love Canal crisis, told them, “Let’s get it over with. You
are hurting Niagara Falls with your publicity. There is no problem here.” 48 Despite submitting
records showing contamination in their homes, the NYSDOH delayed reviewing them, justifying
the delay with a mix of wanting to do a thorough evaluation and constant claims that residents
had submitted incomplete records. 49 When Gibbs and Cerillo met Carey again in the fall and
directly asked him about why the NYSDOH ignored the people who requested a relocation,
Carey avoided answering her directly and made sure to avoid another promise that the
government would help, leaving his answers open to having a non-profit help and framing his
statement in a press release in such a way that no resident could “prove” anything, especially
when combined with the state’s refusal to perform an experiment with a control group. 50
Prioritizing public reputation and financial considerations over public health, officials would
continue to fight against looking into solutions for residents facing problems from Love Canal’s
toxic contamination.

47

Gibbs, Love Canal, 61, 67-71.
Tourism in Niagara Falls had risen over the last three years due to “aggressive promotion efforts” by the city and
by private businesses, but tourists started to show fears of visiting due to the Love Canal toxins. Ibid, 86; Ward
Morehouse III, “Niagara businessmen concerned for tourism,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 16, 1978.
49
Ibid, 82-83, 85.
50
Ibid, 86-88.
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Additional Signs of Government Apathy
In response to the resistance the residents met when asking the government for help, the
residents organized a health study. They found that, among various diseases and high rates of
miscarriages, 56% of children born in Love Canal had a birth defect. When confronted with the
data, government officials claimed that the neighborhood had “a random clustering of genetically
defective people” and that the women did not miscarry but sought secret abortions because of the
hysteria created by the activists. 51 This response showed residents that they would have to fight
the government’s decisions politically, not scientifically, in order to end its apathy and inaction.
Along with the broken promise and the undermined resident health study, the government
showed ineptness in other areas. For example,
“The state did many things that shouldn’t have been done. Once they put some CETA
workers on the canal to cut the grass on the north end with power mowers. The residents
got upset because the chemicals had surfaced in some places. The mowers could have set
themselves on fire or touched off an explosion. The CETA workers had no safety
clothes. The state didn’t think about them any more than they thought about us. We
yelled and screamed, and finally they ordered it stopped. The next morning at nine, the
CETA workers were out there again. Again, we screamed and hollered, and the state
ordered it stopped. The next day, they were out again. We had to confront them every
single morning.” 52
The health department also conducted samples in improper ways. For instance, when it
came to blood testing, health officials conducted the sampling in a disorganized and ineffective
manner. Residents often found themselves waiting in line all day only to have officials tell them
that they had to come back the next day because the supplies ran out or because the workers
needed to leave. Yet, the state rejected all resident suggestions to make having a blood sample

51

Sharon Livesey, “Organizing and leading the grassroots: An interview with Lois Gibbs, Love Canal Homeowners’
Association Activist, Founder of Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, and Executive Director of the Center
for Health, Environment and Justice,” Organization & Environment 16, no. 4 (December 2003): 492.
52
Gibbs, Love Canal, 79.
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taken feasible. 53 With water and air samples, the officials did not handle the samples carefully,
such as leaving them lying all around the school. This treatment of the samples led to readings
consistently coming out wrong. 54 The CETA worker situation and the sample taking procedures
provide examples of how government officials resisted taking actions that would improve their
management of the Love Canal environmental hazards.
When it came to the safety plan for remedial construction, officials wanted Gibbs to okay
the plan in order to show citizen input. However, the safety plan only involved ways to keep
workers safe and not residents, and Gibbs worried that, with concerns as large as explosions, the
residents might violently protest. 55 In the informational meeting on the safety plan, officials
again frustrated residents with inadequate answers. Residents believed that only evacuation
would keep them safe during construction due to the risk that construction would release toxic
gases and potentially cause explosions. In their answers to these concerns, state officials eroded
any confidence in the safety plan. For example, in response to concerns about toxic vapors
escaping during construction, officials responded,
“‘It will smell like hell. It will smell like Hooker. But it won’t hurt you.’’
‘Wait a minute,’ she said. ‘If there’s an odor in the air, and it’s going to smell like
Hooker, something must be causing it. How do you know it won’t hurt my child?’ Dr.
Huffaker said, ‘It will definitely smell. There’s no doubt about that. But it won’t hurt
your baby.’
If you use common sense, you know that something causes a smell… It could affect [a
child’s] lungs or it could be excreted and cause kidney or liver disease… But Dr.
Huffaker expected us to believe that it wouldn’t…
Buses were supposed to be available to take people out of the area if toxic chemicals
were released. Someone asked Dr. Vianna what he would do if toxic gases were released
and the alarm sounded. Would he get on the bus? No, he said, he would run like hell.
That was no way to build people’s confidence. Yet he didn’t understand why people
were upset.”
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Additionally, officials could not describe the air tests that they would use to monitor the
air for contamination. Later, Gibbs learned that at least one state health department official
bragged about his performance at the meeting, saying “he had gotten away with giving political
answers” instead of substantive ones. 56 This statement combined with the officials’ performance
during the meeting showcased clear governmental apathy towards resident concerns and a refusal
to act on them without further political pressure.
Furthermore, mishaps with the safety plan occurred before construction even began.
After resident pressure at a task force meeting, the state organized a neighborhood-wide
evacuation drill in the event of an emergency, such as the construction causing the chemicals in
the canal to explode. The drill performed miserably, with buses leaving groups of waiting
residents behind. This provided more reason for skeptical residents who already disagreed with
the construction and safety plans to believe that the government would not adequately protect
them. 57
When construction began, even more mishaps occurred immediately. Without providing
any notice, the state ordered the demolition of a resident’s house. The resident only discovered
this as he watched the beginning of the construction on the television and saw a crew destroying
his garage and pool. 58 Gibbs furthered explained that the state broke many of its safety
agreements and that the citizens had to diligently keep pressing officials to act on them. When a
tank truck leaked leachate, the officials would not believe the citizens at first. Workers did not
wash trucks down after they left the canal as instructed to from the safety plan. 59 These
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instances provide more examples of how the government did not adequately manage the
situation without building political pressure from the residents.
The Dismissal of the Swale Theory
While thinking of a way to “prove” that health problems resulted from the toxic dump,
Gibbs made the connection between the underground swales and the patterns of illnesses and
contamination. 60 When she showed Dr. Vianna, he told her to verify the swales before he would
add it to the medical data. Recognizing that she would have to seek scientific expertise in order
to add validity to the residents’ requests, she called Dr. Beverly Paigen, who agreed to conduct a
medical survey with Gibbs and others from the association, carefully training them on how to
frame questions and interpret their data. The Niagara Falls Gazette published a story on the
theory, prompting readers to inform Gibbs about the locations of additional swales. 61 However,
the NYSDOH stalled on meeting with Dr. Paigen and Gibbs about the study. This resistance to
looking into a theory that seemed to show a promising connection between the toxins and health
concerns in the area further revealed how the government chose inaction and denial over taking
an action that could protect public health but may have financial and reputational downsides.
When the health department agreed to finally meet with Dr. Paigen in November, she
initially thought it went well. For instance, when the health department said the swales did not
exist where she said, she asked them to put their idea of the swales on the map, and it fit the
patterns better. Despite thinking that the meeting went well, the next day the state claimed that
no evidence backed up the swale theory since housewives in Love Canal helped gather the
results. 62 This continued the trend of government officials saying one thing behind closed doors
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and retracting or changing their statements in public, which continued to delay work towards a
solution for this crisis.
Despite the “housewife data” rejection, the state eventually used the swales theory in
February 1979 in an order that agreed to move people temporarily and issued another order for
the removal of pregnant women and families with children under the age of two. 63 This did not
apply to women considering pregnancy; they would have to get pregnant and then be moved, and
officials continued to avoid answering resident questions about women considering pregnancy
despite growing evidence of miscarriages and birth defects. Moreover, although the state
utilized the swale theory, Dr. Paigen faced harassment and roadblocks from the NYSDOH with
her lab work and funds due to her involvement with the residents. 64 The increasing public
pressure and the building legitimacy the movement gained from conducting studies caused these
orders, but the hesitation to commit to more relocations in spite of the growing evidence of a
public health crisis and the decision to harass an expert who worked with the residents showed
that the government still did not truly want to act in regards to solving Love Canal’s problems.
The health department’s treatment of Dr. Paigen and other scientists and medical officers
provided an insight as to why the broader scientific and medical community did not join her in
assisting the residents and in studying the impacts Love Canal had on public health. 65 Along
with the prospects of conducting research on Love Canal with no funds, scientists with
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controversial or minority opinions often faced discrimination and censorship tactics, and efforts
to protect whistleblowers had not yet seen great success. 66 The scientists that did conduct a
study despite these barriers found that their work faced tremendous scrutiny that the state’s data
did not face due to the secrecy surrounding it, creating yet another disincentive to help the
residents. 67 To unveil the truth about Love Canal to the public and to receive help, the residents
would have to rely on their own energy and the expertise of Dr. Paigen. Residents in other
environmental crises in the late 1970s and 1980s also faced the same prospects of seeking help
and conducting studies without a medical and scientific community that would offer them
assistance due to connections with a health department. 68 In Love Canal, Dr. Paigen’s support to
and direct help for the residents resulted due to her individual ethics instead of a communitywide obligation and ethical code to help those in environmental distress, and the broader medical
and scientific community would roadblock her attempts along with the residents’ attempts to
study and solve the Love Canal crisis.
After construction started, residents asked to meet with Governor Carey in April. At
first, he would not agree to meet with the residents if they brought Dr. Paigen, but eventually he
agreed to have her present as long as the health commissioner attended as well. Right before the
meeting, an incident occurred as residents protested after his plane landed in Niagara Falls:
“He got into his car and started to drive past all the protesting people, when somebody
screamed out, “You are a murderer! You are killing my children!” …Governor Carey
seemed annoyed. He told the crowd he was all they had going for them. If they wanted
to be so public about it, he would be glad to take their names and make their health
problems public knowledge. The residents told him their health problems were already
public. They just wanted to be relocated. The governor seemed perturbed and got back
into his car.” 69
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The fact that the governor initially ignored the protestors and then reacted by threatening
them for making Love Canal public showed that, without political pressure, he would not act
further in regards to the public health crisis caused by an environmental crisis and would simply
view resident complaints as an annoyance.
At the meeting itself, the health commissioner “belittled her scientific ability and
qualifications and said her cancer study was no good.” He would not believe her when she said
she had not conducted a cancer study nor would he provide evidence or data about his statements
of no health impacts at Love Canal, showing again that Dr. Paigen’s attempts to stop the public
health crisis at Love Canal did not mirror the actions and ethics of the broader medical and
scientific community. When Carey looked over her study and heard that the survey did not have
laboratory confirmation yet, he called it “worthless” and threw her papers around the room.
Then, at one point in the debate with Dr. Paigen, Carey claimed his health department had no
secrets despite the refusal to provide data just moments before. 70 The blatant misinformation
about Dr. Paigen’s study that the officials tried to promote, their immediate rejection of it, and
the secrecy surrounding the data and studies used to drive governmental decisions but the denial
that any secrecy exists all pointed towards a government that views evidence of an
environmental crisis with apathy and inaction until an outside public force provides enough
pressure to motivate governmental action.
Continual Roadblocks
The association asked for another health department public meeting in November to
update them on the studies. The department sent deputy health commissioner Dr. Haughie to
present, but the meeting went wrong when Dr. Haughie would not confirm that the department
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found dioxin in the canal and gave answers that the residents knew were wrong, such as dioxin
could not migrate with other chemicals. As the residents became more and more frustrated with
his evasive answers about the health studies and chemicals, Dr. Haughie said, “We aren’t
keeping you prisoner here. You people can leave at any time.” 71 Recognizing that officials such
as Dr. Haughie would not only work to keep them misinformed but also refused to acknowledge
the problems the residents faced from the lack of governmental support during the crisis, they
began to picket the work at the construction despite threats of arrest and tried to convince the
workers to not work. 72
The next month, a day before a task force meeting, the health department released a
statement that the north end of the canal had normal miscarriage, birth defect, and birth weight
rates. 73 Again, the department refused to provide data despite promising to release it the
previous month, and the department continued to delay processing the relocation review. 74 This
added to the number of roadblocks that government officials created in order to stop work
towards a solution for the residents’ public health concerns.
In May 1979, the New York Senate held a hearing in Niagara Falls on Love Canal. Mike
Cuddy, testifying for the state, estimated that the health department would take between two and
two and a half years to evaluate the swale theory and then proceeded to avoid answering other
questions. Gibbs and other residents provided testimony, demonstrated evidence for the swale
theory, and described the conflicts of issues she saw in New York State’s health studies on Love
Canal, given its financial incentives to show outcomes that did not favor large-scale solutions.
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Later, this hearing and others held in May provided the foundation on which senators sought
federal relocation of the residents. 75
After the hearing, Gibbs called Dr. Vianna to check in on the relocation reviews, and he
claimed that many records and documents were missing. The association encouraged every
resident to call and ask about their records, and Dr. Vianna revealed that even more records were
missing. These records were time consuming and difficult to get, and going through the steps to
replace these records may have hindered the relocation efforts due to the burden placed on the
residents. After enough complaints, the records were found, leaving the residents wondering if
the department deliberately misplaced the records in order to hinder relocation efforts. 76
Temporary Relocation
A year later, construction commenced at the north end. Gibbs describes the impacts of
the construction as,
“All the things we had worried about earlier now showed up. Residents were becoming
ill. After the heavy construction on the north end began, the air was humid, hot, and
stagnant, and it reeked of chemicals… I can’t tell you what it was like on some days. It
was hot, and the air would just hang there. The fumes were thick. They made your eyes
water, or you coughed. Someone described it as similar to trying to breathe
underwater…. The air around the canal was horrible. It smelled like a chemical factory.
You could barely breathe.” 77
Despite the increase in serious illnesses, the health department continued to claim that no
problem existed, and despite releasing a statement about the discovery of dioxin in the
neighborhood, the NYSDOH still refused to relocate families and attempted to ban residents
from attending a task force meeting related to the canal. 78 This provides further evidence that the
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state wanted to avoid further political pressure from the residents that would cause the state to
cover the costs to protect residents from the environmental hazard of the toxic dump. Along the
same lines, conversations with the EPA and the National Institute led Gibbs to a realization:
“The health department didn’t want the EPA looking over its shoulders. Therefore, the
department was willing to give up a million-dollar contract [funds offered from the EPA
to the health department to study and remediate Love Canal]. They didn’t want the
Federal Disaster Aid Administration 9FDAA) or the EPA in, so they didn’t request their
help. They didn’t want the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences to do a
study. That didn’t make sense because it would have saved New York taxpayers a lot of
money if they had. Of course, if the National Institute were doing the studies, New York
State couldn’t control what the studies showed…. State officials seemed to be
minimizing the risks.” 79
Residents temporarily relocated to a motel, but the state continued to threaten to send
families back to Love Canal despite a court order to pay for temporary relocation. 80 At an
August task force meeting, the health commissioner recommended against relocating women
contemplating pregnancy, and when Gibbs questioned the decision and pressed for the studies
used to make the decision, officials told her to “go home,” with Dr. Haughie asking her, “Why
don’t you go home and tend to your garden?” 81 Carey refused to meet with Gibbs and had an
aide try to explain to her that she mistreated a great governor and health department. 82 Carey
went on the record as denying any future relocations, temporary or permanent. 83
During this time, Congress passed a bill to relocate everyone from 93rd and 103rd. In
celebration, the residents left the motel on November 5th, believing a follow through soon to
come. However, the city then formed a revitalization committee to determine Love Canal houses
that new residents could move into and barred residents from joining the committee. Gibbs then
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released a survey on Love Canal miscarriages and birth defects to convince the public that no
one should move into Love Canal. 84
Panic Leads to Hostages
In May 1980, the EPA officials informed families of the results of a chromosomal
study. 85 Eleven residents out of thirty-six residents tested had chromosomal breakages, but the
EPA refused to answer how it would impact the families, stating that the tests showed
population-based health risks only and that if the effects came from Love Canal, untested family
members faced chromosomal breakage risks too. This caused panic and screaming at EPA
officials, especially in light of the insensitive treatment of families. Officials still refused to
determine a relocation, but the mayor assaulted an EPA official and screamed, “You can’t drop a
bomb in my city and then walk out, leaving me with this mess!” 86 Instead of feeling concern
about the health impacts his citizens faced at Love Canal, he simply wanted to avoid any
financial and reputational liability from the crisis.
The next Monday, when the association office opened again, residents, reporters, and
other parties stormed the office in a state of hysteria and anger due to both the chromosomal
reports and because a newspaper headline announced, “WHITE HOUSE BLOCKS LOVE
CANAL EVACUATIONS.” Soon, the growing crowd began to set fires, stop traffic, and defy
police orders to leave. 87 To control and direct the crowd’s emotion, Gibbs convinced EPA
representatives to come to the neighborhood to answer questions, and the crowd held them
hostage in the office. Gibbs informed Washington of the hostage situation and kept it until the
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FBI threatened to rush the crowd but not until she demanded an answer from Washington by
Wednesday with a threat of escalated violence. 88 The hostage plan worked. On Wednesday,
Washington announced that eight hundred and ten families from Love Canal would have
temporary relocation, allowed immediately, covered by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration. 89
Other Citizens’ Reactions to the Love Canal Crisis
Throughout the crisis, the residents had to deal with other citizens who stigmatized them
or did not believe that a crisis existed. For instance, citizens outside of the Love Canal
neighborhood feared that the residents would contaminate them. When leaving the August 8th
meeting, Gibbs detailed an incident where a man sitting next to her on a bus panicked because he
feared the chemicals on her. 90 Ring one and two residents who temporarily moved to Falcon
Manor while waiting for relocation reported that the apartment manager had them follow harsh
rules to avoid contaminating the apartment. Many parents outside of Love Canal refused to let
their children play with children in the neighborhood because of contamination fears. 91
Local business leaders also tended to downplay the environmental crisis and focused
more on the impacts protests would have on revenues. John Reardon Jr., the executive vicepresident of the Niagara Falls Chamber of Commerce, claimed that tourism would drop as the
“hysteria” over the false claims about Love Canal’s hazards continued. Susan Clark, publisher
of the Niagara Gazette, also mentioned concerns about falling business revenues throughout the
city because of the Love Canal protests. Restaurants reported drastic declines in sales due to the
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lack of tourists. 92 When the state began auctions on contaminated Love Canal homes, residents
came to protest and yell at landlords who bought them, but the landlords either sarcastically
yelled back or ignored them. 93 In light of the falling revenues and threats to their livelihood,
business leaders did not generally prioritize the health of the Love Canal residents.
During a board of directors meeting for the association in August 1979, the governor’s
liaison attended. Gibbs reported her behavior:
“Cora Hoffman was both aggressive and defensive. She kept saying, ‘I didn’t put the
damn chemicals there. Why are you being so unreasonable? Why are you treating me
this way? I didn’t put the damn chemicals there. I didn’t have anything to do with them.
The governor had nothing do with it. It isn’t his fault.’ She spoke as if the victims of
Love Canal were to blame… Cora Hoffman had no intention of discussing the problem
with us.” 94
Journalists and interviewers from various media sources also sometimes failed to
understand and show support for the residents. In an interview on Buffalo AM, the interviewer
interrogated Gibbs about why the residents would not move out of the neighborhood without
government help. He repeated, “Why don’t you move out? If it’s so bad, why don’t you just all
get up and go? If you worry so much about your health, why don’t you move?” He continued to
reject her explanations that they could not sell their houses, which had no value due to the crisis,
and that the residents could not otherwise afford to move out. 95 During a state meeting after the
February 8 order to temporarily relocate pregnant women and families with young children, a
Niagara Falls Gazette reporter could not understand why residents wanted to talk about health
problems during a meeting about the construction plans despite the explanations provided to him
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and the attending officials’ cold and inaccurate responses to resident concerns. 96 The lack of
understanding that those in the media and news industries showed during the crisis concerned the
residents, as media coverage on the situation provided the only outlet that other citizens may hear
about Love Canal.
Private doctors, in fear of the NYSDOH and potential Love Canal lawsuits, often also
failed to show support to the residents. When trying to gather doctor’s verifications that the
chemicals in the canal caused the residents’ illnesses in order to qualify for evacuation, they
often could not find a physician willing to agree to verify it. 97 While performing surveys, such
as those used in the Swale Theory study, doctors often refused to provide data. 98
Additionally, Love Canal residents faced some trouble from United Way when
organizing programs that would use funds the state provided for medical expenses and for
children in order to limit their exposure from the construction. First, United Way initially
cancelled the plans the residents created with the organization in order to send the children to a
school in the Love Canal neighborhood. After the programs started, the residents did not feel
like the rest of the funds supported them, as United Way used them to fund their secretary and
other employees, none of whom were Love Canal residents. 99 While United Way provided
additional help during relocation, the management of this grant shows that even those who
supported the Love Canal residents sometimes did not understand the needs of the residents.
While Gibbs attempted to call the White House during the hostage situation, the secretary
dismissed the residents’ concerns, stating, “You people have blown Love Canal all out of
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proportion. I have friends who have cancer and they don’t live at Love Canal…” 100 Her
statement reflected the belief that Love Canal did not create a public health concern and that the
residents should accept the state explanations about the health concerns. This also reflects on
how the lack of scientific knowledge of long-term exposure to toxins influenced public opinion
of the events.
Some also criticized Gibbs’s motivations behind protesting. Many of the criticisms call
her efforts at protesting as “self-serving.” These accusations often came from rings one and two
residents who feared that further activism may undermine their evacuation order. However, this
criticism also occasionally from outsiders such as reporters. 101 This ad hominem against Gibbs
provided another way that the public distrusted the activists instead of immediately rallying
behind them.
In the face of less than optimal support from the public, the residents had to continue to
try to win their support in order to gain progress. As Gibbs explained, “We had to keep the
media’s interest. That was the only way we got anything done. They forced New York State to
answer questions. They kept Love Canal in the public consciousness. They educated the public
about toxic chemical wastes.” 102 The focus on the media as a way to garner public support
eventually paid off; as residents drew national attention to their cause, the government made
more concessions to their demands. 103
Love Canal’s Connection to the Flint Water Crisis
The Love Canal crisis revealed a government that initially lacked a sense of urgency to
protect public health until the residents involved in the crisis overcame initial public cynicism via
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the use of the media. The residents purposefully sought publicity in order to garner enough
public support to prompt officials to prioritize the health crisis more than financial or
reputational concerns. In doing so, they not only attained permanent relocation but also created
an environmental health movement that led to successful anti-toxin campaigns. However, they
had to do so without the support of a broader medical and scientific community that had a moral
and ethical obligation to help them. Even though Dr. Paigen responded positively to their
request for help, the lack of a strong response from this community made it harder for the
residents to make their case to the public and to the government.
The residents in the Flint water crisis would face many of the same difficulties that the
Love Canal residents faced from the government, but the public nor the medical and scientific
community in the mid-2010s would not give the same resistance to the Flint residents as it did in
the late 1970s to the Love Canal residents. Public opinion immediately started off in favor of
supporting the residents, and the medical and scientific community’s reaction showed a new
ethical code where experts gave strong support and legitimacy to the activists’ claims with their
research. The changed roles and perspectives of medical and scientific experts in the Flint water
crisis provided a catalyst for quicker governmental action than the residents received in the Love
Canal crisis.
Background of the Flint Water Crisis
Lead Contamination in the United States
From the 1890s through the 1930s, the public health field focused on changing the
environment in order to help stop the spread of disease. Figures in the public health field, such
as Jane Addams and other settlement house reformers, New York Commissioner of Health
Hermann Biggs, and various other Progressives perpetuated the notion that the nation had a
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collective responsibility towards public health and towards creating a society whose living and
working conditions provided a strong foundation for health. 104 In particular, Alice Hamilton’s
work in occupation health led her to study chemically-based illnesses such as lead poisoning, and
she fought the commonly-held idea that the working and living conditions in the United States
could not create the public health issues that other countries worked to combat. 105
However, by the early 1900s, an opposing viewpoint for public health formed; this
viewpoint proposed that public health should focus on individuals rather than the environment
and that public health leaders should concentrate on individual treatment and behavior.
Following the trends of professionalization and laboratory-based science that impacted other
fields during this time, large-scale environmental reforms, such as housing reforms and industrial
reforms, did not play a large role in public health by the 1950s. In addition, the general public
health mindset had shifted from eliminating environmental risks and damage to finding
acceptable levels of exposure and effects. 106
This new mindset did not bode well for the prevention of childhood lead poisoning,
which became a well-known national issue in the 1950s and the 1960s. 107 Lead poisoning’s
causes lie in environmental aspects, such as paint, air, and water. In particular, consumer items
heavily used lead by the 1920s, and lead became a part of gasoline in 1923. Researchers have
identified lead paint as a danger to children since the 1930s. 108 Physicians could provide
individual treatment for individuals afflicted with lead poisoning, but they could not cure the root
cause of physical conditions and environmental conditions when it came to lead poisoning,
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especially if those conditions derived from the product of a powerful industry such as gasoline or
paint. 109 In the 1960s and 1970s, community activism would bring attention to the environmentbased, preventative viewpoint that eliminating lead poisoning needed, and the government would
begin to regulate environmental toxins such as lead, especially after the publication of Silent
Spring and the resulting public pressure to do so. 110
As political and economic concerns led public health activists to debate between reducing
harm from lead poisoning and aiming to eliminate all lead poisoning in the 1980s and 1990s, the
federal government created rules and passed laws aimed at regulating lead in water. 111 The EPA
established the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) in 1991 to prevent high levels of lead and copper in
the water and to determine how to manage water systems that had high levels of these
contaminants. 112 Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, with amendments in
1986 and 1996, to protect drinking water from a number of hazards, including lead. 113 However,
the creation of these regulations did not stop environmental lead crises from occurring.
The Flint water crisis was not the first major crisis involving government agencies that
denied high lead levels in drinking water in the beginning of the 21st century; the residents of
Washington, D.C. faced a similar crisis. In 2001, the D.C. Water and Sewer Authority made a
change to the chemical treatment for the drinking water and also caused lead to leach from the
pipes into the water. Both the D.C. Water and Sewer Authority and the EPA discovered this
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problem by 2002 but did not inform the public. In fact, the problem stayed hidden until 2004,
when the Washington Post released a story on it. 114
Instead of motivating the government to solve the crisis, the publicity led to further
cover-ups that threatened to undermine not only this specific situation but also the scientific
understanding of lead poisoning from drinking water. Hiding problems with its study, such as
the fact that residents had started drinking only bottled water before the blood lead level tests, the
CDC claimed that the lead levels in the water did not hurt anyone and that blood lead levels did
not increase with the increase of lead in the drinking water. 115 Local officials used this report to
further undermine resident concerns. Shortly after, the EPA began to remove warnings about
lead levels in water from its websites regarding the risk of water with 40 parts of lead per billion
or more to pregnant women and children. This cover-up lasted several years until Marc
Edwards, a professor from Virginia Tech and an expert on drinking water, released his own
research on the situation and revealed documents about the CDC from a Freedom of Information
Act request in 2009. 116
Edwards’ work would lead to an investigation by a House subcommittee that strongly
condemned the CDC. 117 In response to Edwards’s research, the House report, and growing
public outrage, the CDC simply added asterisks to its report to respond to the some of the
criticisms instead of retracting the report, and the CDC director explained the report as leaving
“room for misinterpretation.” To this day, some officials, such as DC Water chief George
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Hawkins, claim that evidence does not back claims that any residents faced injury from the lead
in the drinking water. 118
In five years, the Flint water crisis would begin, with officials seemingly not taking any
lessons away from this situation. Similar to the Washington, D.C. crisis, the secrecy and denial
surrounding the government’s involvement in the crisis would appear again, and the residents
would have their concerns about their water and health undermined. This time, however, the
residents would have the backing of a medical and scientific community who would work with
them to cause the government to acknowledge and act in regards to the Flint water crisis.
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
On August 30, 2010, the EPA conducted a review of the MDEQ. The Final Report:
Program Review for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Water Bureau’s
evaluation of the MDEQ, in hindsight, predicted many of the problems that would surface in the
department’s handling of the Flint water switch. For instance, the report describes the challenges
the MDEQ had with Total Coliform Rule compliance, stating that local health departments
needed further training on compliance, that “[t]here seems to be some confusion in applying the
rules,” and listed eleven discrepancies. 119 With Disinfectant/Disinfection By-Products Rules, the
report lists several practices that do not conform to requirements when it comes to chlorine
residual and total organic carbon rules or led to a lack of scrutiny over data despite its technical
compliance with the rules. 120 As for LCR compliance, MDEQ had 17 discrepancies, did not
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calculate all 90th percentiles (the value at which 90 percent of the samples have a measurement
equal to or less than this point), did not immediately notify consumers of high lead levels in their
drinking water, and did not review site-sampling plans or changes due to financial concerns. 121
Coincidentally, the Flint water crisis would see problems with Total Coliform, disinfectants, and
lead.
Furthermore, the report describes the MDEQ as facing budget and staffing problems that
significantly impede the department’s work. The report states:
“Resource limitations, including dramatic budget cuts, have had a significant impact on
MDEQ’s PWSS [Public Water System Supervision] program. Increased regulatory
requirements coupled with a decrease in available funding, have required MDEQ to
prioritize program activities and focus resources on the most important program areas…
Region 5 acknowledges that MDEQ is directing their limited resources to implementing
and enforcing drinking water regulations that directly affect public health.” 122
“At the time of the review, MDEQ was asked by management to prepare numbers to
show how they would absorb a further twenty-percent reduction in the general fund…” 123
“Frequent hiring freezes have impacted Michigan for about ten years. This has made it
difficult to replace positions. There is also a ban on contract services… The state hiring
process is cumbersome, which makes it difficult to hire people, even when positions can
be replaced… good candidates find other positions before MDEQ can complete the
paperwork.” 124
“MDEQ could use further training for water system operators, especially new operators
and regarding new rules… Training for new staff would also be appreciated on
fundamental public health issues and compliance decisions. The training provided at the
onset of rules is sufficient at that time, but there needs to be more repetition after that.
MDEQ would like to see subsequent trainings ‘repackaged’ into smaller modules that
address critical points of decision-making.” 125
“Due to funding cuts and resource shifts, vacant positions are filled with staff from other
programs that have been cut or eliminated. While this practice preserves jobs, it

121

Ibid, 27-28.
Ibid, 7.
123
Ibid, 8.
124
Ibid, 8.
125
Ibid, 8.
122

Hughey 37
decreases the technical knowledge of staff and requires tremendous resources to train
these staff.” 126
These points about budget and staff did not necessarily cause the Flint Water Crisis.
However, they do show an overwhelmed department that found itself mishandling situations due
to a lack of financial resources and personnel.
Flint’s Emergency Manager and the Decision to Leave the DWSD
Flint’s economy once depended on the auto industry and its General Motors plants.
However, starting in the 1980s, the auto industry began to decline in Michigan, leading to drops
in both revenue and population. After about 30 years of a weakening economy, the city faced a
poverty rate of approximately 40 percent in 2015, with 15 percent of homes abandoned. The
increasing challenges led to rising rates of crime, and all of these problems came together to
form the city’s financial struggles. 127 On November 29th, 2011, Flint came under the control of
emergency managers (EMs). 128
For five decades before 2014, the City of Flint sourced its water from the Detroit Water
and Sewerage Department (DWSD)’s pre-treated Lake Huron water but has used the Flint Water
for emergencies, using the Flint Water Treatment plant to treat this water. 129 In 2014, Flint had a
budget deficit, its seventh one in a row, and officials viewed the cost of using the DWSD as a
significant contributor to the city’s financial problems, especially in the context of rising fees for
using the DWSD and the strain the decreasing population had on Flint’s water revenues from
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user fees. 130 In the decade before the switch to the Flint River, the water charges from the
DWSD annually increased by 6.2 percent on average, and emergency managers would
increasingly look to alternative water solutions in order to save money, such as when Mike
Brown asked the DWSD in June 2012 for permission to blend Flint River water with Lake Huron
water in order to save $2 to $3 million a year. 131
In 2012, the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), an upcoming Municipal Water Supply
System in the region that planned to sell raw water from Lake Huron to the surrounding counties
with the intent of avoiding the rising costs of buying water from the DWSD, attracted the notice
of officials in Flint and in the MDEQ. 132 In May 2012, Howard Croft, the Flint Department of
Public Works Director, sent an official letter to Mike Prysby, MDEQ District Engineer,
requesting technical support to develop a partnership with the KWA, as it had “the potential to
be a major factor in our region’s economic development efforts.” In November 2012, then-Flint
Emergency Manager, Ed Kurtz, wrote to state Treasurer Andy Dillon about using the KWA in
light of the DWSD’s rising costs, projected to be $23 million per year by 2020. 133 These
discussions and others focused on the cost-saving measures of using the KWA and the
opportunity for more localized control over the economy.
Following the Treasury Department’s engineering study in February 2013 which showed
that the KWA would save money as compared to using the DWSD, the Flint City Council voted
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to buy from the KWA. 134 While this vote did not create a binding decision due to the
appointment of an emergency manager over the city, it still showed local support of the move.
State officials then used this vote to validate the switch to the KWA. For example, Genesee
County Drain Commission Jeff Wright writes, “… I am glad the residents of Flint were able to
have their voices heard via their elected officials…. There is a basic tenet of government is best
when it has local control. We saw that with the council vote. Nobody… should have these types
of decisions made by people who live outside their community.” 135 With this symbolic vote
conducted, state officials would work towards removing Flint from the DWSD.
The decision to use the KWA in the future rather than the DWSD did not create the water
crisis in and of itself; rather, the following decision to use the Flint River water while waiting for
the completion of the KWA and the management of that decision created the environmental
hazard. When then-EM Edward Kurtz officially decided in April 2013 to move Flint to the
KWA, the DWSD terminated services to the City of Flint, effective in one year. 136 While
termination of services did not necessarily entail a water cut-off in a year, officials interpreted it
as such, and in March 2014, the new EM, Darnell Early, would officially disconnect Flint from
the DWSD. In the meantime, Kurtz contracted an engineering company to prepare the Flint
Water Plant for full-time operation, and officials began to make plans to use the Flint River
water between the end of services from the DWSD and the completion of the KWA. 137
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However, the water quality problems and eventual lead water crisis would later reveal the
inadequacy of these preparations.
Story of the Flint Water Crisis
Considering the Use of the Flint River
Two studies analyzed the use of the Flint River for drinking water before the switch. The
U.S. Geological Survey, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), and the
Flint Water Utilities Department published one assessment in February 2004, titled “Source
Water Assessment Report for the City of Flint Water Supply – Flint River Emergency Intake.”
In this report, these governmental organizations detailed the weaknesses of using the Flint River
for drinking water, describing 96 potential contaminant sources in the source water area and
summarizing the river as having “a very high degree of sensitivity to potential contaminants.” 138
Rowe Engineering developed the second assessment, “Analysis of the Flint River as a Permanent
Water Supply for the City of Flint,” in July 2011 and analyzed the ability that the Flint River had
for providing a permanent drinking water source. This report stated that the Flint River would
require higher operating costs than the Lake Huron supplies due to the additional treatments the
river water would require, would have different “aesthetics” from the Lake Huron water, and
would need an anti-corrosion agent, costing approximately $100 per day, to make it potable.
Rowe Engineering’s report also noted that current assessments had not conducted a “detailed
investigation of potential sources of contamination.” 139 Combined, these two reports may have
discouraged officials from plans to use the river.

138
United States Geological Survey, Water Sources Division, Michigan District; Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality, Water Division; and City of Flint Water Utilities Department, Source Water Assessment
Report for the City of Flint Water Supply: Flint River Emergency Intake, February 2004, 12, 16.
139
Staff of Bridge Magazine, Poison on Tap, 26-27; Elliot McLaughlin, “5 things to know about Flint’s water
crisis,” CNN, January 21, 2016.

Hughey 41
However, officials did not include either report as a “significant consideration” while
discussing the potential switch to the Flint River for drinking water. 140 For example, on
February 6th, 2015, Prysby, admitted that he did not know of a source water assessment of the
Flint River, stating, “I am not aware of any source water assessment conducted for the Flint
River watershed.” 141 The fact that Prysby, described by other staff in the MDEQ as the “most
knowledgeable staff member on the Flint and Genesee County water-supply issues” and as the
one who managed the files for the reports and studies, did not know about the report showed that
the MDEQ most likely did not consider it when making the switch. 142 Without the use of the
source water assessment or the analysis of the river’s water supply capabilities, officials could
not take pre-emptive measures for the water concerns that developed from the switch.
As for the public opinion regarding the switch, the citizens of Flint had reservations about
using the Flint River. In her account of the Flint water crisis, Danessa Violette described the
citizens’ reaction towards this vote as “outraged,” explaining that residents viewed the river as
“utterly filthy” and unusable. However, Violette described the citizens as trusting that the
officials would take the “proper precautions” to make sure that the residents could safely drink
the water. 143 For the time being, the citizens had faith that the government would act to protect
public health, much like Lois Gibbs had in the beginning of the Love Canal crisis, and did not
organize to stop the switch.
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Despite what the residents assumed, not all officials agreed that the city should make the
switch, at least not soon. Glasgow had some trepidation about an upcoming switch to the Flint
River. He first sent an e-mail on April 16th to Adam Rosenthal of MDEQ:
“I am expecting changes to our Water Quality Monitoring parameters, and possibly our
DBP on lead & copper monitoring plan… Any information would be appreciated,
because it looks as if we will be starting the plant up tomorrow and are being pushed to
start distributing water as soon as possible… I would like to make sure we are
monitoring, reporting, and meeting requirements before I give the OK to start distributing
water.”
Glasgow then sent a second e-mail on April 17th to Rosenthal, Prsyby, and Steve Busch,
the Lansing and Jackson district supervisor of drinking water and municipal assistance from the
MDEQ:
“I have people above me making plans to distribute water ASAP. I was reluctant before,
but after looking at the monitoring schedule and our current staffing, I do not anticipate
giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon. If water is distributed from this
plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my direction. I need time to
adequately train additional staff and to update our monitoring plans before I will feel we
are ready. I will reiterate this to management above me, but they seem to have their own
agenda.” 144
Notwithstanding these warnings, Busch e-mailed Wurfel talking points for a public
meeting about the water switch and confirmed that the MDEQ “is satisfied with the City’s ability
to treat water from the Flint River.” 145 Then, on April 24th, the City of Flint Utilities
Administrator asked Croft, Prysby, and Busch to “convey [their] concurrence that there is no
regulatory requirement for us to sign up a backup agreement with DWSD.” 146 Instead of
heeding Glasgow’s warnings, the EM, MDEQ. and Flint would move on with the plans, showing
the government’s willingness to risk a public health environmental health hazard in order to
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serve financial goals. This hastiness led to a water treatment plant that did not have the staff,
resources, and knowledge needed to safely switch the city’s water source. 147
On April 25th, 2014, Mayor Dayne Walling officially switched Flint’s water from the
DWSD to the Flint River as local officials and staff from the MDEQ joined the closing
ceremony. 148 The quotes from these officials highlighted their belief that the switch returned
power to the local authorities and that the switch would provide high quality treated water from
the Flint River. For example, Walling stated, “Water is an absolute vital service that most
everyone takes for granted. It’s a historic moment for the city of Flint to return to its roots and
use our own river as our drinking water supply.” In light of the concerns that the citizens of Flint
had brought to his attention, Walling explained that the “water quality speaks for itself.” Busch
further proposed that the citizens “shouldn’t notice any difference” while Daughtery Johnson, the
Flint Utilities Director, stated earlier that citizens should not have fears about the quality of the
river water, as the Clean Water Act and the recent improvements at the water plant made the
Flint River “a different river” and “a great asset the city has.” 149 But while the officials
celebrated the switch, a hidden problem began to form.
The river water started to leach lead from Flint’s water pipes. Beforehand, the DWSD
added a phosphate corrosion inhibitor to its water that created a passivation layer that protected
the inner surface of the pipes. 150 This stopped the pipes from corroding into the water and
releasing their lead-based materials into the water. 151 However, the MDEQ did not continue
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corrosion treatment for Flint’s drinking water with the switch to the Flint River, telling the Flint
Water Treatment Plant to wait on adding corrosion control until the MDEQ first conducted the
six-month monitoring periods, an order that contradicted “longstanding” LCR policies. 152 The
higher chloride levels in the water removed the passivation layer and started to corrode the pipes,
causing the beginning of the lead problem. 153 While officials noticed the “rustiness” of the water
and recognized that this signaled a breakdown of the iron in the pipes would, they did not
immediately connect it to a lead problem, which would grow without any notice until February
of the following year. 154
Water Quality and Bacterial Concerns
While the lead leached into the water without notice, other water problems revealed
themselves. Almost immediately after the switch, residents began complaining about the quality
of the river water. 155 Residents also began reporting health concerns; Violette described how her
family and friends began to lose large amounts of hair and experienced rashes on their bodies,
which doctors believed developed from using the water. 156 Beyond complaints about potential
health links and the smell and taste of the water, the water tested positive for total coliform and
fecal coliform bacteria, prompting three boil water advisories in a 22-day span in the summer. 157
In response, the city added more chlorine to the water to kill the bacteria. 158 The additional
chlorine would worsen the unknown pipe corrosion and lead leaching problem, but in the
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meantime, officials continued to tell residents that they could safely drink the water and waited
to see the results of the six-month testing rounds under the Lead And Copper Rule, the first of
which began in July 2014. 159
Furthermore, on October 13, 2014, the General Motors’ Flint Engine Operations publicly
stated that it made an agreement to use Lake Huron water instead of the city’s Flint River water
until the completion and initiation of the KWA. The company’s spokesman explained the
decision, stating that the higher chloride levels from the river water could cause damage to the
metal in the plant and that the company had noticed it and began discussing the problem “some
time ago.” At the time, the city’s tests showed the water having a range of 50 to 60 milligrams
of chloride per liter, higher than the 20 milligrams per liter “excellent” level but lower than the
250 milligrams per liter “objectionable” level, and Prysby publicly maintained that this level of
chloride would not harm public health. 160
While officials could have taken this announcement as a sign to begin anti-corrosion
measures or as a signal to examine any potential impacts from the rise in chloride throughout the
city, they did not. Instead, officials worried about the public reputation implications of the
announcements. After an inquiry from Ron Fonger, a reporter from MLive’s Flint Journal,
about the General Motors water switch, Prysby stressed to other officials at the MDEQ to not
brand the Flint River water as corrosive in a public health viewpoint since public health and
manufacturing required different boundaries for chloride levels. 161 This showed that officials
tended towards a myopic focus on meeting minimal requirements versus analyzing the changes
in water quality in order to predict and discover potential problems.
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While the MDEQ did not see the announcement as a potential indicator of water quality
problems, Snyder aides became alarmed. On October 14th, deputy legal counsel Valerie Brader
urged many colleagues in the administration to ask the emergency manager to consider switching
back to the DWSD until Flint could use the KWA. 162 Chief legal counsel Michael Gadola joined
her, stating,
“… (T)o anyone who grew up in Flint as I did, the notion that I would be getting my
drinking water from the Flint River is downright scary. Too bad the (emergency
manager) didn’t ask me what I thought, though I’m sure he heard it from plenty of others.
My Mom is a City resident. Nice to know she’s drinking water with elevated chlorine
levels and fecal coliform. I agree with Valerie. They should try to get back on the
Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.” 163
Snyder then requested a briefing paper about Flint’s water from the MDEQ, which
blamed the boil-water advisories on e-coli bacteria, with a main cause as the corrosion from the
iron water pipes. 164 This briefing paper showed that the MDEQ knew that corrosion had created
a bacterial problem, and even though the paper does not mention lead, this knowledge combined
with previous recommendations to utilize optimized corrosion control could have led officials to
consider corrosion control. Instead, the MDEQ continued to ignore the signs, even when such a
signal came from its own report.
Another bacterium, Legionella, would soon become another concern with Flint’s water.
On October 21st, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) notified
Genesee County that a recent outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease may have derived from Flint’s
water. In fact, the corroding pipes may have contributed to providing a favorable environment

162

Ibid, 38.
Ibid, 39.
164
Ibid, 39; Office of Governor Rick Snyder: Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Flint Water Advisory Task Force:
Final Report, 17.
163

Hughey 47
for Legionella growth. 165 Between the water switch in June 2014 and November 2015, 87
residents would develop this disease, leading to 10 fatalities. However, the MDEQ would not act
for months in regards to these emerging concerns. 166 Liane Shekter Smith, head of the Office of
Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance for the MDEQ, instead worried that the county would
announce that the water caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. 167
On the contrary, the Genesee County Health Department (GCHD) would struggle to
obtain time-sensitive information for its Legionella investigation from the Flint Department of
Public Works and the MDEQ, who also initially refused to meet with the health department and
to consider studying the water as a potential source of Legionella. 168 When James Henry from
the GCHD e-mailed both agencies in March 2015 to complain about the lack of communication
and information, e-mails from MDEQ officials showed confusion about the requests for
information and irritation over the health department’s desire to investigate the water as a
potential cause. For instance, Wurfel informed an aide to Snyder that, while Legionnaires’ cases
have increased in Genesee County, Henry made a “beyond irresponsible” assumption that the
drinking water in Flint caused the cases and that his department “failed to do the necessary
traceback work to provide any conclusive evidence of where the outbreak is sourced.” Busch,
with the support and agreement of several other officials in the MDEQ, responded to Henry’s
inquiry, claiming that Legionella most likely did not come from the water and that the GCHD
showed “premature and prejudice” in their judgment, directing the department to investigate
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“water main breaks, water leaks, and system repairs.” 169 The MDEQ’s response also lacked
information on the lack of corrosion control, which would have provided evidence to the GCHD
of the water’s potential cause in the outbreak. 170 Henry replied, stating,
“There have not been any conclusions regarding the source of the illnesses. Our team is
gathering information and we suspect there may be several sources. It has been made
clear that the Flint municipal water system is in compliance with the Safe Water Drinking
Act. It seems reasonable that your office would be involved regardless if a potential
health risk from municipal water is related to… exposure…”
“…I was informed there was no reason to meet because the municipal water system is in
compliance with the Safe Water Drinking Act…. Based upon [discussions with the
MDCH, the CDC, the EPA, Legionella experts, and water system experts] we have been
informed that it is likely that a small amount of Legionella will survive the water
treatment process at the plant and enter into the distribution system.” 171
The March 2015 correspondence would not remove the conflicts between the GCHD and
the MDEQ, and, when the MDHHS later condemned the GCHD for contacting the CDC, Henry
would continue to assert that other state officials impeded the GCHD’s work on the outbreak. 172
An e-mail from Crooks to the MDEQ describing how changes to the water typically leads to
quality issues and how Legionella may result from the water distribution system did not seem to
resolve this impediment. 173 In later e-mails to colleagues, he condemned the state officials for
sabotaging the investigation and causing deaths, with criticisms ranging from calling the MDEQ
department “a stubborn 2yr old child” to describing some state officials as “criminals [who are
good] at covering their tracks.” 174 The inaction of the MDEQ when it comes to the Legionella
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outbreak and its reaction to the GCHD’s investigation revealed that, while an agency removed
from the decisions related to the environmental crisis and the management of the crisis wanted to
investigate and potentially solve an aspect of it, officials involved in the decision or management
of the crisis show resistance to investigating it. 175
Water quality tests in December 2014 revealed another water quality concern, this time
involving a chemical problem. Flint citizens received a letter in January 2015 from the city
stating that their drinking water violated the Safe Water Drinking Act because of the level of
trihalomethane (TTHM), a by-product of chlorinating the water due to the bacterial concerns. 176
Over time, exposure to TTHM can increase cancer risks and liver, kidney, and central nervous
system concerns. 177 In addition, these results initially led officials to believe that the high
TTHM levels may have caused the discoloration complaints, but in late January, Jim Sygo,
MDEQ’s Deputy Director, forwarded a Bridge Magazine story about Flint Water published
earlier that week to Shekter Smith and explained how he did not think TTHM by itself could
cause the discoloration residents see in their water, and Shekter Smith theorized that perhaps the
different water chemistry caused the discoloration. She stated,
“A change in water chemistry can sometimes cause more corrosive water to slough
material off of pipes as opposed to depositing material or coating pipes in the distribution
system. This may continue for a while until things stabilize. It would be unusual for
water leaving the plant to have color like people are seeing at their taps. Generally, this
is a distribution system problem or a premise plumbing issues. Since it appears widespread, it’s most likely a distribution system problem.” 178
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Here, the top official in the MDEQ realized in writing that the water may have caused
city-wide corrosion in Flint’s pipes. In a department full of experts on drinking water, someone
could have analyzed the situation further and realized that the lack of corrosion control created a
risk of a lead hazard. However, the MDEQ officials took no action in regards to the signs of
corrosion beyond theorizing about it, and the department later fought against using corrosion
control in spite of these early hints.
Throughout the beginning of the Flint water crisis, the water provided various challenges
to public health that government officials in the MDEQ handled ineffectively. While they did
act to control the total coliform and fecal coliform bacteria levels and did notify the residents of a
TTHM violation, officials performed them to minimally comply with the water safety laws;
officials did not act to solve other developing concerns that did not have laws mandating action
to solve them, such as the rise in resident reports of negative health effects from the water, the
growing signs that the water needed an anti-corrosion treatment, and the outbreak of
Legionnaires’ disease. 179 Instead, officials continued to publicly defend the decision to switch to
the Flint River and focused on increasing public confidence in the water. The residents would
have to organize a stronger protest in order to prompt a different governmental response.
Initial Protests
The 2015 new year brought in a growing number of resident complaints and protests
about Flint’s water. Richard Benzie, operations chief of the DEQ’s Office of Drinking Water
and Municipal Assistance, noted the number of calls and their “tenor” about Flint’s water to
other DEQ staff in an e-mail sent on January 7th. The discussion focused on restoring public
confidence and its perception of the safety of Flint’s water, as would other official discussions
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related to Flint’s water in January. 180 While the rising complaints had received attention, they
had not yet gotten to the point where officials would reconsider their management of Flint’s
water problems.
On January 21st, Flint citizens such as Florlisa Fowler organized a protest against Flint’s
water at Flint City Hall before a city council meeting. Councilman Eric Mays joined the protest,
proposing that Flint return to the DWSD, and citizens such as Cindy Marshall agreed with this
stance. 181 At the city council meeting itself, Flint citizens, many carrying bottles of their
discolored tap water, filled the town hall as Department of Public Works Director Howard Croft
explained the city’s plan to improve the water quality. Walters attended both the protest and the
meeting. 182 After reviewing the water quality concerns, officials such as Busch instructed those
at the meeting that only certain individuals should worry about the water quality and could seek
advice from their doctors. Croft ended the meeting despite not answering all of the previously
submitted questions, leaving residents furious and feeling like the meeting wasted time instead of
finding a solution, as reported by citizens such as Claire McClinton. Another Councilman, Scott
Kincaid, continued to propose switching back to the DWSD after the meeting, despite Ambrose
telling councilmembers before the meeting that solutions would only focus on fixing the water
distribution and treatment systems. 183
Two days after the meeting, Walling released a statement that, even though the city voted
to join the KWA, it did not have a say in using the Flint River. He put the blame on the
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emergency manager, the Snyder Administration, and the DWSD for the situation. 184 Meanwhile,
the Snyder administration worried about how Flint’s water would impact the government’s
public relations. Ari Adler, the Special Projects Manager, e-mailed Jarrod Agen, the
Communications Director, on January 23rd about Flint water, saying,
“This is a public relations crisis – because of a real of perceived problem is irrelevant –
waiting to explode nationally. If Flint had been hit with a natural disaster that affected its
water system, the state would be stepping in to provide bottled water or other assistance.
What can we do given the current circumstances? 185
In the meantime, residents continued to protest Flint’s water and the state’s insistence that
the water did not pose a safety concern, especially when a Flint city audit showed that their water
rates would rise by 6 percent in the current year. 186 In a January 29th Bridge Magazine article
titled “Cringe over Troubled Water: Flint’s smelly dilemma,” Chastity Dawsey reported on the
rising fear and frustration in the city in regards to the water. She interviewed Ineatha Waters
about how she did not use the water she paid for despite the city assuring residents that the water
did not pose “an emergency nor public safety threat”, and Rev. Bryon Moore of Concerned
Pastors for Social Action stated the anger over the costs, the water quality, and “the lack of a
democratic process” with emergency manager’s control of the situation. He further explained
that his organization in particular planned to organize the community to prompt state action and
that citizens considered a class-action suit in regards to the water. Mayor Walling also explained
his frustrations with the state government and how he directly petitioned Snyder for financial
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help for the city. These demands aligned with his constituents’ blame on Snyder for the
emergency manager. 187
In spite of the growing public and local negativity towards the use of the Flint River
water, state officials did not change their stances on how to manage Flint’s water situation.
Ambrose rejected the DWSD’s offer of a waived reconnection fee to rejoin on January 29th. A
day later, public protests prompted Dave Murray, Snyder’s Deputy Press Secretary, to explain
that he did not want Wyant to publicly claim Flint water’s safety until the county health
department completed trace back work on the Legionnaires disease outbreak. 188 The MDEQ
also released a backgrounder on Flint’s water to Snyder that showed its unchanging stance
towards the water crisis. Describing the boil-water advisories and trihalomethanes as “hiccups,”
the report further detailed them as “not like an imminent threat to public health.” Instead of
showing urgency about these problems, the report stated that the issues will naturally fade “once
the city connects to the new KWA system in 2016.” 189 These officials’ stance against moving
back on to the DWSD and not taking any drastic measures to fix the water problems but instead
simply waiting for the completion of the KWA to solve these issues would continue to hold
strong.
An exception lied with the other officials in Snyder’s administration. Dennis Muchmore,
the Chief of Staff, worried about how the public perceived the administration in light of Flint’s
water. He wrote to his coworkers, “Since we’re in charge we can hardly ignore the people of
Flint… if GM refuses to use the water in their plant and our own agencies are warning people
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not to drink it… we look pretty stupid hiding behind some financial statement.” 190 Although the
administration still believed that switching Flint back to the DWSD would not help in light of the
financial concerns, Snyder’s administration did announce $2 million in infrastructure funding for
Flint in light of the “civil unrest” in Flint and the increasing number of complaints and requests
for help. 191 In this case, the growing public outcry has begun to cause the administration to act,
even if the EM’s actions did not change.
Flint’s Lead Crisis Begins to Surface
Officials started to see evidence of the lead crisis in February 2015. Jennifer Crooks, the
EPA’s program manager for Michigan’s Region 5 Drinking Water Branch, e-mailed officials in
both the MDEQ and the EPA regarding lead in Flint’s water. 192 Since January, Crooks
corresponded with LeeAnn Walters, a Flint resident, about the water in her home. Walters, who
others described as a “classic stay-at-home mom”, noted the change in water quality and its
impacts on her family in December 2014. 193 After reporting black sediment in the water and
health concerns related to the water, Glasgow from the water treatment plant tested her water,
leading him to discover that her water contained 104 parts per billion of lead. 194 Crooks
described how the new water source’s chemistry may have caused contaminants to escape the
biofilms in the pipes and asked the department of community health to view it from an
epidemiological perspective. 195
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Officials from the MDEQ did not show alarm over the lead in LeeAnn Walters’ home.
While Prysby responded to Crooks that the city would help Walters, he restated that the city
itself was within the lead allowable limit, and Busch sent an e-mail to officials at the MDEQ,
stating, “As indicated by Mike and Adam the city is meeting 90th percentile. Not sure why
region 5 sees this one sample as such a big deal.” 196 That same day, the MDEQ falsely notified
the EPA that Flint treated its water for corrosion. 197 This lie, combined with the apathetic
response the MDEQ showed to Walters’ sample, would help stop progress on the lead crisis for
months.
A day later on February 27th, Miguel Del Toral, the EPA’s Ground Water and Drinking
Water Regulations Manager from Region 5, further contributed to the previous discussions and
warned the MDEQ about a potential lead problem. Identifying the potential problem as
particulate lead, Del Toral described how pre-flushing the tap before taking samples of the
drinking water can bias the results towards low lead measurements, as particulate lead
“sporadically” escapes from lead piping, meaning that pre-flushing the tap temporarily clears it
out and leads to a lower level of lead than what the population intakes on a daily basis. He
additionally asked what optimized corrosion control treatment Flint used for its water and stated
that Flint had to have such a treatment according to the Lead and Copper Rule. 198 However, the
MDEQ does not take action with Del Toral’s correspondence nor does the organization look into
corrosion control.
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Additionally, Veolia, an engineering firm, released a report about the Flint River water
and how to improve it for drinking water. 199 Despite not mentioning a lead problem, Veolia
detailed several revisions for chemical treatment, among which they listed corrosion control in
the form of a polyphosphate chemical to manage the discoloration of the water. 200 MDEQ also
rejected the corrosion control advice from the report, and both of these rejections would
foreshadow the department’s resistance towards future requests to implement optimized
corrosion control.
Instead, government officials continued to promote Flint water as safe to drink and as
healthy as the water from the DWSD. Then-Flint Emergency Manager Jerry Ambrose sent two
memos on March 3rd, one to the Michigan Department of Treasury and one to Deputy State
Treasurer Wayne Workman, proposing that switching back to the DWSD would cost too much,
that water quality might not change with a switch due to the city’s infrastructure, and that the
water met all safety standards. 201 Concurrently, the Snyder Administration began to plan to hand
out water bottles and water filters to Flint citizens without having the city itself distribute them in
order to not “undercut” the idea that the population could safely drink the water. 202
In the meantime, Walters became more and more involved in the Flint water crisis. After
receiving a phone call in February to not allow her children to drink the water after her water
samples, Walters started studying in depth about lead, which led to her realization that her son
had lead poisoning. She began to go door-to-door to warn the residents of Flint about the
dangers. While informing other residents, she continued to contact Crooks, especially when a
follow-up test showed her lead water levels at 397 parts per billion and when a blood lead level
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test showed that her son had 6.5 micrograms of lead per deciliter. Furthermore, as Ambrose
assured the Treasury department that the city should continue to use the Flint River, Walters first
contacted Del Toral, who then connected her to Edwards, the same expert who led the revelation
of the lead contamination in the Washington, D.C. water system. She would contact Edwards in
April 2015 in a “pivotal moment” and lead him to research Flint Water. 203 Unlike in the Love
Canal crisis, the Flint residents would soon receive a large support base from the medical and
scientific community that would cause a critical change in the outcome of the crisis.
On March 24th, the Flint City Council voted 7-1 to stop using the Flint River and to “do
all things necessary” to return to the DWSD. Ambrose, despite having heard about the
Legionnaires’ outbreak and its potential link to the water two weeks ago, immediately issued a
statement that called switching back to the DWSD “incomprehensible” and financially illogical,
as he believed that the costs would rise to a minimum of 30 percent higher if the city switched to
the DWSD while waiting for the KWA. 204 In addition, he restated that both the EPA and MDEQ
guaranteed that citizens could safely drink the water. 205 The residents’ protests and reports had
convinced the local officials of the need to take drastic action, but the state officials would take
longer to change their course of action.
On April 24th, Pat Cook, a water treatment specialist in the MDEQ, asked Prysby about
Flint’s corrosion control. Prysby responded that the water treatment plant had not implemented a
corrosion control treatment, which contrasted with the statement they made with the EPA in
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February. Busch confirmed with both Cook and Prysby that the Lead and Copper Rule did not
require Flint to implement corrosion control based on the results of the two rounds of lead copper
monitoring. Cook agreed but warned that Del Toral would call to disagree, a prediction which
proved correct on that same day. In response to the call, Busch and Cook discussed Del Toral in
e-mails sent on April 27th, describing how they viewed his actions as “over-reaches” and that
they grew tired of having their interpretation and implementation of the law challenged. 206
With this discussion validating their viewpoint, Cook e-mailed Del Toral, with copies to
Crooks, Thomas Poy (EPA Ground Water and Drinking Water Branch Chief), Benzie, and
Busch, explaining the MDEQ’s interpretation of the EPA’s rules on corrosion control that Flint
did not need optimal corrosion control unless their two six-month monitoring samples showed a
problem that bypassed the allowable measurements. (The first six-month samples showed lead
at 6 parts per billion in a sample size of 100 homes, meeting the legal requirements.) 207 After
describing that the MDEQ would not make a “formal decision” on the implementation of
corrosion control until after the second round of six-month monitoring on June 30th, 2015, Cook
went on to say, “As Flint will be switching raw water sources in just over one year from now,
raw water quality will be completely different than what they currently use. Requiring a study at
the current time will be of little to no value in the long term control of these chronic
contaminants.” 208
On May 28th, samples taken at Walters’ house showed an improvement in lead levels.
This came after the replacement of a city water main. 209 Given this update and the fact that her
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house’s plastic plumbing could not leach lead, officials should have seen this as a sign that the
lead derived from city water main and not her individual plumbing. Combined with the previous
signs and warnings of corroding pipes, these water system experts could have begun an inquiry
as to whether the pipes leached lead elsewhere in the city. However, officials continued to abide
by their interpretation that their compliance with the rules had stopped any serious water
problems and that any major concerns came from individual plumbing issues.
On June 24th, Del Toral sent an eight-page memo to Poy regarding Flint’s lack of
corrosion control and lead levels. 210 In it, he described how the lack of corrosion control, the
pre-flushing sampling techniques, the addition of chloride to combat organic matter and TTHM
violations, the increasing blood lead levels of Walters’ son since the switch, the fact that
Walters’ residence contained plastic plumbing that would not have led to leach all point to a
hidden lead problem in Flint, and other resident-requesting testing without pre-flushing all
revealed a hidden lead problem in Flint. 211 He made several recommendations on mitigating
lead in water and reviewing Flint’s compliance with optimal corrosion control and with its
sampling pool. 212 The MDEQ first heard of this memo on June 30th, when Tinka Hyde (Water
Division Director of EPA’s Region 5) e-mailed Shekter Smith. Hyde stated that after the memo
underwent revisions, the MDEQ would receive a copy of the memo, and she also mentioned that
Del Toral shared the memo with Walters due to the use of her situation in the report. 213
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In spite of Del Toral’s findings, Crooks further downplayed the lead problem on July 1st
and showed a lack of urgency when she encouraged the MDEQ to not implement a corrosion
control study. In her e-mail, she stated,
“Our discussions with MDEQ indicate that no phosphates/corrosion control has been
added to the system since April 2014 when the source of drinking water changed to the
Flint River. We understand that the City is just finishing up its second set of 6-month
initial monitoring for lead where the results will probably warrant a Corrosion Control
Study to be conducted. Since Flint has lead service lines, we understand some citizenrequested lead sampling is exceeding the Action Level, and the source of drinking water
will be changing again in 2016, so to start a Corrosion Control Study now doesn’t make
sense.
Miguel believe[s] that lead levels in Flint are being affected by the lack of corrosion
control being conducted by the City…. Steve Busch stated that in the Lead sampling
pool, almost all of the lead sample sites are lead service lines and the State is not seeing
large increases in lead levels at tap….
Miguel’s point is that… the existing requirements in the LCR may not be as protective as
previously thought. Thus, he can only make recommendations as to how to revise
sampling protocols.” 214
Her acceptance of the MDEQ’s alternative compliance strategy for corrosion control
followed a national trend that the EPA had of allowing differing compliance strategies across the
country, which weakened the agency’s ability to decrease lead risks. Additionally, the EPA
could have chosen to act on Miguel’s memo and enforce corrosion control, but it decided not to.
It would take increased public pressure to motivate the EPA to take more authority over the
situation. 215
On the same day, Susan Hedman further undercut Del Toral’s memo and concerns in an
e-mail to Walling, who requested Del Toral’s memo after hearing about it from the ACLU.
Hedman apologized for the spread of the preliminary draft report. 216 However, Hedman still
refused to send Walling a copy of Del Toral’s report under the premise that it had not undergone
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vetting by the EPA. 217 This led Walling to conclude that the EPA did not agree with Del Toral’s
findings, and during his re-election campaign, he told voters that “Del Toral’s report didn’t
reflect the opinion of the entire agency.” 218
On July 9th, Curt Guyette used Del Toral’s memo to break the story about lead in Flint’s
water. This made the report available for everyone to read, including the MDEQ officials who
have waited on the EPA internal review. 219 Wurfel reacted, “Miguel apparently asserts that the
DEQ and EPA are at odds on proper protocol. Which seems weird.” Busch asserted that the
MDEQ will not comment on the draft report given its interim nature but put forward the strategy
of citing regulations to defend MDEQ’s sampling procedures. Hedman provided a public
comment from the EPA that stated that the EPA and MDEQ continued to work together to
examine lead contamination and ensured that the water met federal safety standards. 220
Public stunts in June and July would further work towards discrediting the concerns
about Flint water, especially when the ACLU reported about Del Toral’s memo. Walling joined
Crooks in downplaying water quality issues, drinking a cup of Flint water on TV to show its
safety. 221 Wurfel released a statement over the radio to tell citizens to “relax” about any
potential lead problems while privately e-mailing the Snyder administration to complain about
how the community groups “worked hard at keeping [residents] confused and upset… and
misinformed.” 222 However, the community decided to respond to governmental inaction and
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undermining through the legal system and began to prepare a lawsuit, providing a counterpoint
in the media against the officials’ statements and behavior. 223
Additionally, the MDEQ decided to require only 60 samples for the second six-month
testing period under the guise that Flint’s population had decreased, despite the EPA’s statement
that Flint needed 100 samples. 224 In light of the building disagreements between the EPA and
the MDEQ on the MDEQ’s use of the lead and copper rule, the two agencies had a conference
call on July 21st. However, this did not seem to reconcile the differing beliefs on the
implementation of the rule. 225 The EPA could have utilized its authority under the Safe Drinking
Water Act or the LCR to enforce its sample requirements but chose not do so, perhaps because
the public outrage and protests had not grown to a point where the EPA would take further
action. 226
These 60 samples showed 11 parts per billion of lead in the drinking water, almost twice
as much as the first six-month testing period showed. 227 Busch’s e-mails on July 24th relaying
these results to Wurfel and others in the MDEQ maintained that, despite the increase, the results
did not cause a concern because they did not reach the Action Level Standard of 15 parts per
billion and that Flint had maintained a lead level under 15 parts per billion for the last 20 years
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(despite the fact that Flint used the less corrosive Lake Huron water during those years). 228 He
went on to further state that the samples met regulatory requirements and that Flint would
conduct a corrosion control study within 18 months and would install a fully optimized corrosion
control treatment within two years. 229
As the MDEQ finished conducted the monitoring samples and discussed this prolonged
timeframe for acting, residents increasingly targetted the Snyder administration for the water
protests and activism. For example, Flint ministers arranged a meeting with the Snyder
administration and brought along residents, an engineer, and a college professor to discuss the
high lead levels found in 80 water tests. 230 While MDEQ officials discussed how to “edify” this
conversation to show the safety of Flint’s water, the Snyder administration considered acting on
these concerns. Muchmore asked both Nick Lyon, the director of the MDHHS, and Wyant to
look further into Flint’s water, stating, “These folks are scared and worried about the health
impacts and they are basically getting blown off by us (as a state we’re just not sympathizing
with their plight).” 231
The MDEQ quickly acted to persuade the administration that the government should not
take action on these protests. Wurfel e-mailed Muchmore, Wyant, and Tom Saxton at the
Michigan Department of Treasury, stating that, “Everything checks out in terms of compliance,
but now the next step is optimizing the water supply… Conceivably, by the time we’re halfway
through [the corrosion control study], the city will begin using a new water source with KWA…
In terms of near-future issues, the bottom line is that residents of Flint do not need to worry
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about lead in their water supply, and DEQ’s recent sampling does not indicate an eminent health
threat from lead or copper.” 232 Convinced that the MDEQ gave him sound information and
recommendations, Muchmore simply replied, “Thanks.” 233
As for the MDHHS’s response to Muchmore’s concerns that the state blew off the
public’s concern, the department began analyzing blood lead levels in Flint. 234 Epidemiologists
noticed that blood-lead levels in children under 16 rose right after the switch to Flint River water
but swiftly concluded that this derived from seasonality, not from the water switch. 235 Until
disputed, this study would cement the officials’ stance to not take action in regards to the water
crisis and to tell the public to continue consuming the water.
Continuing disagreements between the MDEQ and the EPA on corrosion control
followed these studies in August. On August 3rd, the EPA relayed meeting notes from the July
21st conference call to Shekter Smith. 236 Neither agency showed concern over the increase in
lead in the water, and the meeting minutes mostly discussed corrosion control. 237 While the
MDEQ refused to change its practice of pre-flushing before taking samples, the notes showed
that the MDEQ agreed to “get phosphate addition going in Flint as soon as possible” and to
continue corrosion control when the city switched to the KWA. 238 However, the MDEQ does
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not order optimized corrosion control to Flint until two weeks later, and the MDEQ gives Flint
two years to do so. 239
These instances with the Snyder administration, the MDEQ, the MDHHS, and the EPA
and the earlier incident with the GCHD’s Legionnaires’ investigation showed that, even though
public protests and action may convince part of the government to act in regards to an
environmental crisis, the residents’ activism needed to reach a point where enough agencies and
officials viewed the crisis as something that needs urgent attention. Otherwise, those still leaning
towards apathy and inaction may work to convince the other officials and agencies to not take
action or to hinder those that act on the crisis.
The Virginia Tech Study
As the MDEQ debated the EPA on the necessity for corrosion control, the MDEQ
escalated its conflicts with residents in a meeting with Flint residents, including Walters. In this
meeting, officials proclaimed that “Del Toral had been ‘handled’” and that the EPA would reject
his report. Additionally, when confronted with Walters’ concerns, the officials acted in much the
same way as government officials did in the Love Canal crisis; the residents reported that
officials smirked and laughed at her, refusing to respond to her in a serious and professional
manner. 240 Angered at this response, Edwards informed the MDEQ on August 23rd that his team
from Virginia Tech would study Flint’s water. 241
After this meeting, Wurfel further undermined Walters, who contacted Senator Gary
Peters after receiving no support from the MDEQ. Mike Brown, Snyder’s senior federal policy
representative, contacted Wurfel on August 27th about her contact with Peters and asked why her
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lead levels far surpass the 90th percentile. Walters, describing Walters as “a very vocal resident”
and as the resident “who had EPA lead specialist come to her home and do tests, then released an
unvetted draft of his report (that EPA apologized to us profusely for) to the resident, who shared
it with ACLU, who promptly used it to continue raising hell with the locals,” explained that the
lead issues derived from plumbing in individual homes. 242 He further described,
“Bottom line is that folks in Flint are upset – because they pay a ton for water and many
of them don’t trust the water they’re getting – and they’re confused, in no small part
because various groups have worked hard at keeping them confused and upset. We get it.
The state is trying like mad (to) get the word out that we’re working on every aspect of
the health safety of local water that we can manage, and the system needs a lot of
work…. (I)t’s been rough sledding with a steady parade of community groups keeping
everyone hopped-up and misinformed.” 243
This type of dismissive response towards actions taken by private citizens would define
the MDEQ’s response to the Virginia Tech results. 244 On September 2nd, Edwards and the team
of researchers from Virginia Tech University released the results of their research into the lead in
water in Flint. After analyzing 120 water samples from Flint, the team found that 42% of the
samples measured more than 5 parts per billion of lead levels, with 20% of those having more
than 15 parts per billion, the level at which the EPA sets as the lead action limit. In response,
Croft released a statement saying that the city of Flint followed all safety and quality standards,
and Wurfel stated that the Virginia Tech results do not match the city’s two rounds of testing and
that Flint’s water met all safety standards. 245
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The MDEQ quickly acted to convince the public of the inaccuracy of Virginia Tech’s
Results. On the same day that Edwards released the research, Wurfel gave a press release to Ron
Fonger, a reporter from the MLive Media Group, stating that the water and the city’s
transmission lines did not cause any lead problems but that individual homes’ plumbing
contaminated their drinking water with lead. In the same press release, Wurfel stated that
Virginia Tech’s results did not match any of the state’s blood lead-level testing in order to further
show that the public should not take Virginia Tech’s report into consideration. 246 Wurfel
repeated the same with Michigan Radio on September 6th, explaining,
“The samples don’t match the testing that we’ve been doing in the same kind of
neighborhoods all over the city for the past year. With these kinds of numbers, we would
have expected to be seeing a spike somewhere else in the other lead monitoring that goes
on in the community.” 247
The Flint Department of Public Works joined the MDEQ in assuring the public of the
water’s safety. On September 3rd, Croft e-mailed many state and local officials, stating that the
water complied with EPA standards on lead and with the Michigan Safe Drinking Water Act.
He also defended the decision to not use corrosion control at first, explaining how phosphate
based corrosion control chemicals can support bacteria in the water and that both the MDEQ and
an engineering firm discussed delaying corrosion control until further testing took place. 248
Seeing a repeat of the denial that happened in the Washington, D.C. water crisis, the
Virginia Tech team created FlintWaterStudy.org to post their results and updates on the crisis. 249
Edwards described the rationale behind using this strategy, saying, “… we started directly
working with ACLU and the activist groups in Flint, which is kind of something you don’t do,
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because people will say you’re an activist… But what I learned in D.C., science alone is
powerless… to these agencies.” 250 On September 8th, Edwards used this website to publish the
full results of the Virginia Tech team’s tests. 251 Reporting that the Virginia Tech’s samples
showed a 90th percentile of 25 parts per billion of lead in the water, which exceeded the EPA’s
allowable level of 15 parts per billion, and describing very high samples, such as one sample
reaching over 1000 parts per billion, the article decried the MDEQ’s statements regarding the
safety of Flint’s water. 252
The next day, Wurfel e-mailed Fonger of MLive.com to state that the MDEQ “is just as
perplexed by Edwards’ results as he seems to be by the city’s test results, which are done
according to state and federal sampling guidelines and analyzed by certified labs.” 253 He
attempted to convince Fonger that the Virginia Tech team did not properly conduct their
research, simply “set out to prove” their pre-determined theory, and used their research to “[fan]
political flames irresponsibly.” 254 Wurfel not only acted to manipulate the public opinion of the
Virginia Tech’s study but also attacked their credibility as scientists in order to do so, mimicking
the officials’ behavior toward Dr. Paigen in the Love Canal crisis.
The MDHHS had a delayed reaction to the Virginia Tech results. Eleven days later, emails showed that several key officers in the department still had not analyzed the Virginia Tech
results. At the same time, the MDHHS worried about the impacts the public meetings organized
by the researches had on the public opinion, and reports from Michigan Radio and MLive Media
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Group further alarmed the department, which described the issue as “blowing up.” On
September 23rd, the MDHHS began to prepare a briefing for Snyder about Flint water. In
Mikelle Robinson’s e-mail, she described the explanation the DEQ gave her, which contained an
explanation of how the water “is not an imminent public health problem but a public confidence
problem due to the many groups getting involved and controversial reports/media coverage.” 255
As Edwards attempted to convince EPA officials of the faults and violations in the
MDEQ’s sampling procedures, EPA departments outside of Region 5 noticed the reports and
coverage on his research. In particular, Dr. Yanna Lambrinidou from the EPA National
Drinking Water Advisory Council Lead and Copper Rule workgroup, a group that recommended
revisions to the Lead and Copper Rule, sent an inquiry to Wurfel and Busch about Flint’s water.
He asked about the optimal water quality parameter ranges that MDEQ determined for Flint’s
water and wanted to know where to find them. Busch responded that, since Flint had not
implemented an optimized corrosion control treatment, the MDEQ did not set any water quality
parameters. 256 Given the MDEQ’s resistance to implemented corrosion control until the KWA
came online, this heavily suggested that the MDEQ had not planned on ever setting water quality
parameters while using the Flint River.
The Virginia Tech results and subsequent public reaction did not cause a change in
governmental stance nor action on Flint’s water. Similar to the officials’ reactions in the Love
Canal crisis, the MDEQ, MDHHS, and Flint Department of Public Works undermined the data
and evidence provided by private citizens that point to an environmental and public health crisis
and instead focused on how to control the damage to the public confidence in the officials’
stances and decisions. In order to change the officials’ actions of managing their public
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reputation to conceding to public demands, residents and researchers would have to further work
on revealing and decrying the Flint water crisis.
The Hurley Study
As Edwards and the Virginia Tech team studied samples of Flint’s water, Dr. Mona
Hanna-Attisha, who became interested in a potential lead problem in Flint in August 2015 after
hearing about the lack of corrosion control, and her team from the Hurley Medical Center looked
into levels of lead in 1,746 blood samples from Flint children, with a focus on the distribution of
water lead levels based on zip codes. 257 These samples came only from the Hurley Medical
Center because the MDHHS refused to release their blood sample data to both Hanna-Attisha
and Edwards. 258 After the switch from the DWSD to the Flint River, she found that the
percentage of children with 5 micrograms per deciliter of lead in their blood or higher almost
doubled (from 2.1 percent to 4 percent) while the children most at-risk saw almost triple the rates
of elevated blood lead levels (from 2.5 percent to 6.3 percent). The report urged the city to
declare a health advisory in order to receive federal assistance. 259
Before Hanna-Attisha released the results on September 24th, the MDHHS prepared to
deal with the public backlash with a mix of alarm and scorn. MDHHS Deputy Director Geralyn
Lasher, in her e-mail to other MDHHS officials, described the Hurley report as a “‘study,’” with
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the quotations implying that she considered the report as something other than serious scientific
results to take into account. 260 The talking points that MDHHS developed noted that the
MDHHS did not yet review Hurley’s results and that the state’s methodology and seasonality
theory “provide[d] a much more robust picture” of blood lead levels. 261 Snyder’s Deputry Press
Secretary Dave Murray warned numerous officials at the MDHHS and Wurfel that the Hurley
report took a “very emotional approach” of “pointing to individual children.” 262
After the release, the MDHHS disputed Hanna-Attisha’s study, claiming that her findings
resulted from seasonal variables, not due to the water. This aligned with the MDHHS’ July
study, prompted from Snyder’s chief of staff’s concerns about lead in Flint water, that any
increase in blood lead levels resulted from normal seasonal differences. Additionally, MDHHS
staff such as Wesley Priem of the Healthy Homes Section accused Hanna-Attisha’s study of
finding its motive in “little science and a lot of politics.” 263 Deputy Director Geralyn Lasher, in
her critique of the Hurley report, also described the data as “‘data’”, with the quotations again
implying a lack of seriousness or authenticity. 264 Wurfel joined the criticism, labelling HannaAtish as causing “hysteria” with “unfortunate” comments given that “Flint’s drinking water is
safe in that it’s meeting state and federal standards. The system has an aging portion that needs
to be addressed.” 265 The Detroit Free Press quoted Wurfel as saying, “We’re confident with
what we’ve done, but we know there are concerns.” 266
The officials’ immediate dismissal of the Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s work had similarities to the
reaction officials had to Dr. Paigen’s report, but a significant difference occurred in the way their
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institutions and professional connections treated them due to their research. While Dr. Paigen
faced harassment and eventually had to leave the state to continue her work, Dr. Hanna-Attisha
reported that “everybody [Flint and the medical community] had [her] back.” She explains,
“Even though we are city-chartered and we get state funding and this was politically messy, there
was never a question that we had to do what was best for the community.” 267 This support from
the scientific and medical community and this team’s belief that they needed to take an active
role in combating the environmental injustice in the Flint water crisis showed a change since
Love Canal, when scientific and medical experts did not rally to support Dr. Paigen and fight
against an environmental injustice.
Meanwhile, Edwards sent Robert Scott, the lead data manager at MDHHS, a scathing email questioning why both himself and the Hurley team could not access the state’s data, stating:
“Can you tell me why it is so difficult to get this data, and why your agency is raising so
many obstacles to sharing it with everyone who asks?... I have to say, it is very disturbing
that the state keeps issuing these blood lead reports and statements in their press releases,
and refuses to share the data backing them up with outside researchers…. I note that I
have been asking to see your data since MDEQ first sent it to reporters back in August,
and I count 10 emails that I sent responding to all your questions. As of yet, you have
given me nothing in response.” 268
Scott crafted an e-mail stating the confidential nature of the data and apologizing for not
completing the process of getting the data to him before leaving on vacation. Nancy Peeler from
the MDDHS reviewed the e-mail and told him to make it less apologetic and less open to attack
on image protection, believing that Edwards intended to “escalated and spin things” with his email. Scott agreed. 269 However, while this is taking place, Scott used Hurley’s methodology to
attempt a recreation of their results. While prefacing it with an explanation that he did “not

267

Bridget Kuehn, “Pediatrician Sees Long Road Ahead for Flint After Lead Poisoning Crisis,” JAMA 315, no. 10
(2016): 968.
268
Staff of Bridge Magazine, Poison on Tap, 110.
269
Ibid, 111.

Hughey 73
[find] as much difference as (Hurley) did,” he admitted to seeing similar results but stated that he
did not want the public to see these findings. 270
Scott and Peeler followed through with this statement. The day after his discovery, Flint
issued a Lead Advisory, which increased public attention and media requests from reporters. 271
While developing a lead story on the advisory, the Detroit Free Press’ Kristi Tanner requested a
response to her conclusions that the switch to the Flint River led to an increase in lead poisoning,
and Scott and Peeler planned to respond that lead poisoning as a whole decreases year by year
even though some areas see “bumps from year to year while still trending downward overall.” 272
They blatantly hid their findings from the previous day. Less than two hours later, Scott
concealed more information, this time from Hanna-Attisha. The day before, he asked Peeler
about analyzing MDHHS’ data only for children ages 0 to 5. On the 25th, Hanna-Attisha pointed
out the uncommonness of measuring lead levels for children older than 5 and asked if he
analyzed the data just with younger children. He responded that he had not without letting her
know of his indications that the department should look at this data. 273
Other staff in the MDHHS failed to competently react to the situation and to feel the
increasing panic that the Flint residents had in regards to the developments, even in light of
increasing media coverage. Various staff failed to locate a copy of the Hurley report or data but
did not feel pressured to find a solution. 274 In any case, MDHHS Director Nick Lyon prepared
to build a case against both the Hurley report and the Virginia Tech report. On September 28th,
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he wrote, “I would like to make a strong statement with a demonstration of proof that the lead
blood levels seen are not out of the ordinary and are attributable to seasonal fluctuations.” 275
The desire to immediately build a case against the Hurley report without first considering its
potential validity delayed progress towards solving the lead crisis.
On the 29th, Lasher e-mailed the department that Genesee County had released a health
advisory for Flint and had stated, “The county is prepared to take further action if the State fails
to provide the requested data [the state blood-level data] by September 30, 2015. Further action
could include a request for outside independent evaluation of the data and to declare a Public
Health Emergency in Flint.” 276 Lasher named the notice “a ransom date.” 277 Concurrently,
Lasher asked various staff in the MDHHS, including Scott and Peeler, about blood lead level
data in children under six. However, the staff conversed with each other and agreed that, “It’s
bad enough to have a data war with outside entities, we absolutely cannot engage in competing
data analyses within the Department, or, heaven forbid, in public releases.” 278
Meanwhile, the Muchmore sent an e-mail to Snyder and others in the administration
about the situation. He analyzed it on a political level, explaining how the MDEQ and MDHHS
felt like the issue has turned into “a political football” with the various groups in Flints accusing
the departments of “shift[ing] responsibility to the state.” He described that the administration
dedicated large amounts of time to Flint’s water not only because of lead poisoning’s impacts
and the controversy of the switch but also because of Dillon’s role in the decision to switch the
water. 279 The next day, in another political analysis, Muchmore stated,
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“The water certainly has occasional less than savory aspects like color because of the
apparently more corrosive aspects… but that has died down with the additional main
filters. Taste and smell have been problems also and substantial money has been
extended to work on those issues.
“Now we have the anti everything group turning to lead content which is a concern for
everyone, but DEQ and DHHS and EPA can’t find evidence of a major change… Of
course, some of the Flint people respond by looking for someone to blame instead of
working to reduce anxiety. We can’t tolerate increased lead levels in any event, but it’s
really the city’s water system that needs to deal with it. We’re throwing as much
assistance as possible at the lead problem as regardless of what the levels, explanations or
proposed solutions, the residents and particularly the poor need help to deal with it…
The residents are caught in a swirl of misinformation and long term distrust of local
government unlikely to be resolved.” 280
Muchmore’s explanations not only show that the he continued to trust the MDEQ and
MDHHS of their stance on the safety of Flint’s water but that their stances have also hardened
him against the Flint water activists. Furthermore, on September 28th, Snyder received another
briefing that the lead levels in Flint complied with federal standards and that replacing the lead
service lines would cost at least $60 million to the city, possibly $8,000 for homeowners to
replace their private lead connections, and would take 15 years. 281 The agencies entrusted with
protecting public health and his own administration showed a solitary front against taking the
activists’ information and demands seriously.
In spite of this, Snyder showed signs of taking an opposing viewpoint and of listening to
activists and supportive politicians such as State Senator Ananich. 282 On September 29th, the
Executive Director to the Governor, Allison Scott, sent an e-mail that showed Snyder’s shift
away from deflections to action. Calling the situation an “emergency,” the e-mail detailed the
items Snyder would like to talk about in a meeting:
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“1. Emergency Management – similar to disasters, is there some form of action we can
engage for this situation to help manage.
2. Chief medical officer – should be speaking with Hurley
3. WIC – re water and formula – status update
4. Drain commissioner – how do we expedite KWA” 283
The sense of urgency and desire to speak to the private citizens driving the protests and
counterpoints showed that the public outcry reached a point to where the governor would work
towards meeting the demands of the residents and activists in spite of the advice from his own
administration. Publicly, the Snyder administration still abided by the MDEQ’s stance that the
residents could safely drink the water, such as when one of his spokesman confirmed the secret
delivery of 1,500 water filters to residents but still maintained that the water met all safety
standards, but behind the scenes, the administration made swift moves to solve the
environmental crisis. 284
Reconnecting to the DWSD
At the start of October 2015, the Snyder Administration made serious inquiries into
having Flint rejoin the DWSD that soon turned into reality. In response to the Snyder inquiry,
DWSD offered an immediate, short-term reconnect with no reconnect fee, a fixed monthly rate
of $662,000, and other expenses charged without an added profit margin expense. 285 At the
same time, the MDHHS admitted that an analysis of both the Hurley report and the MDHHS
data pointed to the same conclusions when using the same zip code methodology from the
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Hurley report. 286 Immediately afterwards, the Snyder administration released an action plant for
Flint’s water crisis. 287 Within a week of the announcement, the water filter distribution
drastically increased, the State Budget Director determined $10.4 million in state aid for the
action plan, and Flint developed a plan on switching back to DWSD. 288 The reconnection to
DWSD officially occurred on October 16th. 289
The reconnection did not automatically solve the lead crisis. Due to 18 months of
corrosion, the pipes no longer had any remaining barrier to stop the lead scales from leaching out
of the pipes. The corrosion control would take time to optimize.290 Furthermore, the health
crisis for residents who suffered from lead poisoning would continue for the long-term, and the
city would need increased, long-term investments in education, public and mental health,
juvenile justice, and nutrition for up to 20 estimated years in order to combat these effects. 291
However, without residential activism and an involved scientific and medical community, the
reconnection would not have occurred. Reconnection would provide the necessary first step to
resolving the environmental crisis in Flint.
Shaken Faith in Government
In January 2016, CNN reported that all of the residents and officials that they interviewed
laid the blame at both Snyder and the MDEQ. Early in the month, around 100 protesters
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marched from the city hall in Flint and called for Snyder’s resignation. 292 Social media
intensified the blame as celebrities, activists, and other citizens joined together to criticize the
governor. 293 The Snyder administration recognized this growing anger; Snyder himself
apologized in his State of the State address and began to work more towards providing solutions
for the crisis, such as seeking $28 million in aid from the state and requesting support from the
National Guard. 294 To regain public trust, he released his administration’s e-mails related to the
crisis. 295 The crisis also caused the resignation, firing, and/or criminal prosecution of various
officials involved in the situation. This list eventually included Wyant, Wurfel, Busch, Prysby,
Glasgow, Croft, Hedman, and Shekter Smith. Walling lost his reelection due to the crisis. 296
However, these actions did not seem to reinstate public trust in the government. 297
Chastity Pratt Dawsey again reported on the residents’ reaction to Flint water, this time in
February 2016. Due to experiencing false and conflicting information, bad communication, and
a length of time with no solution, she found that the culture in Flint included a mistrust in
government, suspicion, and even “paranoia” as described by government agencies. Dawsey
reported residents that did not trust water filters and donated water, some even rejecting them,
and that many residents no longer believed the blood and water tests conducted by government
officials. Residents reported still feeling effects from the water and wondered if their lives
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would ever return to normal. One resident even spoke of fearing that the National Guard
members distributing water might shoot her. Residents detailed their fears for their children’s
futures in light of positive tests for lead poisoning. Victoria Marx testified of how her diagnosis
of Parkinson’s disease may have resulted from the lead she consumed from Flint’s water and
blamed the emergency manager for this development. Kathleen Fridline noted that the MDEQ
sent a letter to her mother about her water containing 78 parts per billion but that the letter had
no actions outside of calling the local health departments about any questions. 298
Dr. Hanna-Attisha further described in March 2016 of how parents still did not trust the
government. She describes, “Parents are traumatized. For almost 2 years, we were betrayed.
There is a huge lack of trust in the government and a fear of the unknown.” 299 In her opinion,
both the events during the Flint water crisis and the long-lasting health impacts that remain will
cause long-lasting mistrust in the government, and she called for other physicians to take on
more whistle-blower roles in regards to environmental crises causing public health issues,
stating,
“This is our job. This is why we went to medical school—to help people. As we progress
through medical school and training, we get jaded. We focus on reimbursement and
EMRs [electronic medical records], and we lose focus of what we are called to do.
It’s even more of a calling as pediatricians. Kids can’t vote. They can’t tell you, give me
immunizations. They can’t tell you they need a car seat or better gun control. It’s our job
to be their voice, even more so in communities that are voiceless and underserved. I think
pediatricians no longer think they are credible in their communities. [But] this change [in
the state and federal response to Flint water contamination] happened because of
physicians, not because of public health or other community voices.
Moms were complaining. Activists were complaining. Pastors were complaining. The
water experts were complaining. But it took the voice of physicians to make change.
Physicians need to realize their powerful role in communities, to do good for their
communities.” 300
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Her quote further emphasized the changed roles and values found in the scientific and
medical community in regards to whistle-blowing and taking an active role in fighting against
public health issues created by environmental injustices. In contrast to Love Canal, the scientific
and medical community in the Flint water crisis felt an ethical obligation to help the residents
cause a change.
Connecting the Two Events
As seen in both the Love Canal and Flint water crisis events, the governmental reaction
remained similar. Officials first did not believe an environmental public health emergency
existed and maintained this stance even in the face of residential complaints. The rationale
behind this behavior remained similar both events, as officials prioritized economic concerns
over the risks to public health, defended their reputation and their integrity instead of listening to
the residents and recognizing that they needed to change their course of action, and focused on
technically complying with the law instead of determining whether they needed to act further in
order to prevent or stop a public health crisis. 301 In order to cause a shift in governmental action,
residents had to both become increasingly noticed in the public eye and initiate contact with
scientists who listened to their concerns and produced scientific studies whose revelations would
arm the residents with formal evidence to use in their complaints.
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The residents in Flint achieved this quicker than the residents in Love Canal for a variety
of reasons. The public itself had changed since Love Canal in ways that made them more
receptive to the activists’ calls for action. For example, the public knowledge of environmental
hazards grew between the Love Canal crisis and the Flint water crisis, meaning that the Flint
activists had to spend less time educating the public and convincing others that they needed
help. 302 In addition, United States citizens developed a sense of complacency in the 1990s about
environmental issues and had lost a sense of fear and urgency about looming environmental
dangers. 303 Therefore, an event such as the Flint water crisis came as a shock to many in the
public.
Along with the changes seen in the general public in the United States, the activists in
Flint also found a scientific and medical community that showed them more support than what
the activists in Love Canal had. Comparing these two events show a historical change in the
scientific and medical community in the United States in regards to their response to public
health issues related to environmental crises; beforehand, Love Canal showed that this
community did not view itself as inherently responsible for assisting those experiencing a public
health crisis due to environmental injustice, especially in the context of conflicts of interests with
governmental officials or bodies. In the recent Flint water crisis, the response of the Virginia
Tech team, the Hurley Medical Center, and the experts involved to the residents’ request for help

302

At the time of the Love Canal crisis, the public did not have a lot of knowledge on the human health impacts of
chemical exposure on populations outside of adult male workers who spent four hours a week working with high
chemical levels. Marci Culley and Holly Angelique, “Women’s Gendered Experiences as Long-Term Three Mile
Island Activists,” Gender and Society 17, no. 3 (June 2003): 452; The public had widespread knowledge of the
dangers of polluted water, especially when it comes to lead poisoning. On a national and state level, lead poisoning
had greatly decreased since the 1990s due to legislation aimed to prevent lead poisoning and increased knowledge of
lead’s impacts on health. Therefore, the residents did not have to work towards convincing other private citizens that
polluted water and lead endangered human health. Instead, the public immediately viewed them as innocent victims
of governmental actions. Office of Governor Rick Snyder: Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Flint Water Advisory
Task Force: Final Report, 23.
303
Kline, First Along the River, 145.
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and for working with them to combat the government’s actions revealed a shift in the ethical and
moral obligations that this community felt towards those experiencing environmental injustice.
The actions of these scientists and doctors revealed that the scientific and medical community
felt obligated to assist those in environmental crises versus declining the residents’ request for
aid.
In the future, environmental historians should further research this shift in the scientific
and medical community. For example, new research could focus on how activities and events in
the environmental health movement in the United States impacted the way scientists and medical
experts interact with and view public health issues related to environmental crises. 304 Historians
could also examine specific actors in major events, such as Gibbs in Love Canal and Walters in
the Flint water crisis, in order to see how their requests and actions influenced the scientific and
medical community. 305 In any case, studying this change in the scientific and medical
community has the potential to create exciting developments in the field of environmental
history in the United States.

304

Love Canal provided the foundation for the environmental health movement and the success for anti-toxin
campaigns. Gibbs, first starting to act in regards to her son’s health and then the relocation of the local residents,
connected the struggle to issues with toxins across the nation. The protests against Love Canal did not just lead to
the relocation of the residents; it also led to the development of Superfund or the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, designed to handle other “Love Canal” waste disposal
situations. However, national environmental organizations did not generally join Gibbs in fighting toxin issues
across the United States, prompting her to form the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes to provide support
from one grassroots movement to other local movements, the results of which led to substantial victories for antiincineration campaigns.Gibbs, Love Canal, 2-3, 200; Christopher Rootes, “Acting Locally: The Character, Contexts
and Significance of Local Environmental Mobilisations,” Environmental Politics 16, no. 5 (2007): 736.
305
Despite her move to Virginia in October 2014, Walters stayed connected with the events in Flint. As of this
writing, she continues to advocate for the city and for other cities with lead problems, such as Philadelphia, and she
has testified before governmental committees investigating Flint water. Her original concern of the increased lead
levels at her residence and the impacts on her family has developed into her involvement in a widespread, universal
issue, which may influence the scientific and medical community further. Staff of Bridge Magazine, Poison on Tap,
127; when officials claim that residents are wrong about their experiences with an environmental crisis, those
involved have to prepare to debate them with more than just their personal accounts; they have to study the scientific
fields related to their situation and research their issue. Repeated requests and calls for help with this over time may
have also contributed to the change in the scientific and medical community. Marci Culley and Holly Angelique,
“Women’s Gendered Experiences as Long-Term Three Mile Island Activists,” 447.
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